

MODERN LANGUAGE NOTES.

Baltimore, March, 1900.

MEETING OF THE CENTRAL DIVISION OF THE MODERN LANGUAGE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA.

THE fifth annual meeting of the Central division of the Modern Language Association of America was held at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tenn., December 27, 28, 29, 1899. The first session was held in the Chapel in University Hall, and the following sessions in the room of one of the literary societies in the same building.

The Association first listened to a brief address of welcome by Chancellor J. H. Kirkland of Vanderbilt University. He spoke of the necessity for raising the general standards of culture and scholarship. That the position of modern languages in the University of today is an assured one, and that their recognition is everywhere demanded, is shown by the establishment of separate chairs. In the past, especially in the South, this was attained only after a resistance. The battle for modern language has been won in the University, but it should be necessary for every reputable high-school to give instruction in those branches as well.

The President of the Central Division of the Modern Language Association, Prof. C. Alhonso Smith, of the University of Louisiana, delivered his annual address. This subject was "Interperative Syntax." He said in part: The traditional treatment of syntax under the heads of Empirical, Historical, and Genetic, is insufficient. Syntactical phenomena need to be correlated with other linguistic processes and interpreted in broader terms. Syntactical effects are closely allied to literary effects, and the sharp separation of the principles of literature from the principles of syntax has been detrimental to both. Syntax has become mechanical and statistical, while literary criticism has become mincing and arbitrary. What is called æsthetic syntax is not broad enough, for syntax may be interpreted not only in terms of the æsthetics, but in terms of history, sociology, and ethics."

Many illustrations from modern and ancient languages were cited, and attention was also called to the significance of the syntax of sub-

stitution and the syntax of omission. At the close of the session an informal reception was tendered the members of the Association in the University library.

At the second session, in the absence of the Secretary, Prof. Schmidt-Wartenberg, Prof. Blackburn of the University of Chicago was chosen Secretary *pro-tem*. After the reports of the Secretary and Treasurer had been read, the President appointed committees on nominations, auditing, etc. The first paper "Are there Two Authors in the Idylls of the King," was read by Prof. Richard Jones of Vanderbilt University. The essayist applied to the *Idylls of the King* the same critical method adopted by the *Faust* commentators. We find that entirely different conceptions of Arthur existed in the minds of Tennyson's most intimate friends; some viewed him as the irreproachable Knight, while others asserted that the poet intended to depict Arthur as the conscience or the soul. It was shown that at one time Tennyson himself intended that the *Idylls* should be taken allegorically, and that some of them were written with that idea in mind. But as was the case in *Faust*, this symbolism was carried too far, and Arthur was allegorized away to a type of the conscience, and Guinevere to a type of the sensual, in man. The poet himself finally was tempted to stem this tide of allegorical interpretation, and the final tendency was to emphasize the humanity of the *Idylls*. We must then look upon the introduction of the allegory as an after-thought and a mistake. The King is a composite portrait of two conceptions.

The paper on the "Elizabethan Sonnet" by Prof. C. F. McClumpha of the University of Minnesota, discussed the so-called sonnet sequences or cycles from the appearance of Sir Philip Sidney's collection in the year 1591 to the year of the publication of Shakespeare's *Sonnets* in 1609. The purpose of the paper was not to trace the English sonnets back to the Italian or French originals, nor to examine the structure of the English sonnet. It sought solely to present the various kinds of imagery and oft-repeated conceits employed by the writers of sonnet-cycles. The general classifi-

cation of sonnets usually adopted by investigators in this field of Elizabethan literature was followed; namely, sonnets written in praise of some real or imaginary mistress or man, more or less amatory in nature, the theme of love being generally told as a continued love-story. Sonnets composed upon religion, philosophy, and other kindred subjects, usually classed as a secondary and later development of the sonnet, as well as the third general class of sonnets, comprising dedicatory poems addressed to patrons, etc., were not included in the discussion.

The sonnet-cycles belonging to the first class were next taken up in order of publication. An attempt was made to arrange the vast amount of what might be termed sonnet-material. Such an arrangement was made so as to disclose the varied conceits, the imagery, situations, reflections, parallelisms, and possible borrowings, made by one sonneteer from another, from the earliest true sonnet-cycle down to the latest. Love was shown to be the principle theme. This theme was accompanied and contrasted with a vast array of subsidiary sentiments, all reflecting the amatory state of the lover and mistress. Such sentiments as hope, desire, delight, pleasure, etc., were contrasted with their opposites, fear, despair, pain, sorrow and sadness. The descriptive sonnets were analyzed, showing the strange efforts made by the writers to present their mistresses' charms in new and startling phraseology. The scenic effects and descriptions of celestial and terrestrial phenomena were compared, as well as the imagery borrowed from mythological lore. Various writers were found who made extensive use of imagery taken from the fine arts, such as music, painting, weaving; again from the well-known professions and interests of their time, such as jurisprudence, usury, warfare, navigation, commerce, etc., etc. Contrasts or, as the Elizabethan sonneteer termed them, contraries, from a large portion of the conceits common to the sonnet construction of this period. Many such uses of 'contrasts' were pointed out in the general survey of the cycles. Possible borrowings were also cited. Sonnets on special themes, such as sleep, magic, the four humors, the four Deadly Sins, etc., were given a place by themselves at the

close of each discussion. The purpose of this study of sonnet collections was to present some systematic account of the literary material employed in sonnet literature. It is believed that such an analysis presented the most exhaustive and instructive grouping of conceits, descriptions, in a word, sonnet-material, that has yet been made. Such a grouping solves many of the sonnet riddles.

The next paper was entitled "Qualities of Style as a Test of Authorship; a Criticism of Wolff's *Zwei Jugend-Lustspiele von Heinrich von Kleist*" by Prof. John S. Nollen, of Iowa College. On the basis of a criticism of Wolff's argument from style (a portion of a review of Wolff's entire argument is to appear in the *Journal of Germanic Philology*), the paper concluded with a statement of some principles of comparative criticism.

The problem of fixing the authorship of an anonymous work by the test of style must be recognized as a very complex and difficult one. There are such things, in the abstract, as a prose style, a poetic style, a style of literary form, a style of a nation, a style of a dialect unit, a style of a literary period, a style of a literary group, a style of an individual author, a style of a period in the author's life, a style of an individual work. Every one of these is more or less of an abstraction, and every one of them is a complex of the same basal qualities—intellectual, emotional, imaginative, æsthetic, grammatical, and of diction. The interrelation of these various "styles" is a matter of extreme intricacy, and a mathematically accurate statement of even the relation of any one to any other, or of the precise limits of any one, is practically impossible. And yet these relations and limits are of decisive importance in the solutions of problems of authorship or of poetic individuality.

The most elementary requisite to fixing of the authorship of an anonymous work is a thorough knowledge of the common qualities of the period, or literary group, whose product the work evidently is. A comparison with the style of any one author alone is almost sure to lead to erroneous assumptions. The author who is suspected of responsibility for the work in question, must be seen against the background of his period and his school, perhaps

also of a particular model, and it will require the sharpest vision and the most delicate discrimination to distinguish the personal shading he gives to the color of the *Zeitgeist* that shines through him: it is just this *nuance*, however, that is of the greatest value in determining the final result. The more or less roughly approximative characterization of an author's style by his biographers is useless for such an investigation, and even monographs upon style are usually of little value for this purpose, because they commonly fail to make the necessary distinction between individual and group qualities.

Again, it is only as the analysis approaches complete exhaustiveness that the results will be approximately conclusive. The discovery in an anonymous work of a few select qualities of an individual author's style is practically worthless as a test of authorship. The only acceptable test, after the influence of *Zeitgeist* and literary school has been eliminated, is an all-round comparative investigation of the anonymous work and of the known work of the author in question, on the basis of a rationally symmetrical analysis of style—such an analysis, for instance, as is suggested by Mr. Crawshaw in his book on *The Interpretation of Literature*; to Mr. Crawshaw's outline under Style it will be necessary, of course, to add the important topics of Diction and Grammatical Usage.

Another important requisite is an appreciation of the relative value of the various tests applied. To illustrate from the study of figures of speech: The mere classification of figures according to subject, or according to development, is a relatively unimportant basis of comparison, though it is the only one Wolff seems to recognize. Of far more weight are such questions as these: whether the figures, of whatever subject-matter, are original, or commonplace and stereotyped; whether they are imaginative or intellectual, essential or mechanical and external—in other words, whether they are a mark of real or spurious concreteness; whether they have any emotional significance; whether they are used dramatically, that is, have a definite relation to character and situation; whether they are static or dynamic. Such tests as these immediately set off the figurative usage of Wolff's anonymous come-

dies from that of Kleist, and identify it with the conventional style of the period as represented by Kotzebue and others.

There is no reason why literary investigation should not be strictly scientific in its methods and scientifically reliable in its results. But if the critic is to escape the charge of dilettanteism, if his art is to be organized into a science, he must proceed according to scientific principles—he must be diligent in collecting all the available facts, he must be intelligent, systematic, and unbiased in studying them, and he must base his final decision strictly on the evidence when it is all in. It must be noted, however, that a scientific method, vitally important though it be, is not sufficient in itself. While criticism should become a science, it must still remain an art. There are values in style, imaginative, emotional, and æsthetic, which cannot be weighed by even the most delicate intellectual mechanism; they can be determined only by the reaction of sympathetic appreciation. This is not saying that criticism becomes after all a mere matter of subjective caprice: it is only a warning to people who are color-blind that there is a limit to their usefulness as critics of painting.

The fourth paper on the "Geste de Guillaume at the Close of the Eleventh Century"—[to appear in *Romania*] was presented by Prof. Raymond Weeks of the University of Missouri. A summary was given of the existing datable monuments concerning the *Geste*, from Ermoldus Nigellus in 826, to the *Liber de miraculis Sancti Jacobi* in 1137-47, and a survey was made of the theories already advanced concerning the condition of the *Geste* in the eleventh century. The statements made by Gaston Paris, in his *Littérature Française au Moyen Age*, are the most accurate thus far given forth. Subsequent research has brought out more clearly some points of detail in the analysis of M. Paris, but no important part of his theory has been overthrown.

In the absence of Prof. Julius Goebel of Leland Stanford Jr. University, his paper on "The Suffix -arja" was presented in abstract by Dr. Herman B. Almstedt of the University of Chicago. The paper discussed the Grimm theory, which has now been given up. The essayist inclined to the belief that the suffix

had in Gothic an independent existence, although it is not found in Germanic as a separate word. The possibilities of light being thrown on such proper names as Ariovistus, Ariorichus, etc., were mentioned.

The paper of Prof. Frederick Kloeber, of the University of Minnesota, was presented in abridged form by Prof. C. F. McClumpha of the same institution. The subject was "Notes on the Alfredian Version of Bede's 'Ecclesiastical History of the English People'." The author discussed the great need of delving into the linguistic details of the O.E. *Bede*. 1. *The Vocabulary* is characterized, on the one hand, by a considerable number of rare words, more or less distinctly by Anglian vocables, and terms of poetical flavor—the percentage of such unusual lexical elements being much higher than has been hitherto assumed—and, on the other hand, by 'unusual words' (Sweet), chiefly compounds and derivations, formed in close imitation of the Latin original. 2. The Anglian coloring is (with Dr. Miller) to be looked upon as a survival rather than scribal innovation. As a result of a minute comparison of the MSS., the assumption that the original text may, after all, have been in Alfredian West-Saxon, appears methodically inadmissible. The internal evidence points to the North. 3. Out of a large number of corrections and annotations, one *emendation* in the Cædmon Story (iv, 24) is presented. 4. The question of the authorship, which in fact requires a lengthy discussion of all the Alfredian works, is briefly touched. If sensibly interpreted, the designation "Alfredian" is perfectly proper.

"The Grammatical Gender of English Words Used in German" was the title of the paper read by Prof. Charles Bundy Wilson of the University of Iowa. The paper examined first, the three principal theories of the origin of grammatical gender—Adelung-Grimm, Brugmann and Wheeler, and also stated the salient points in the arguments against the first two. It then showed how far these theories may be applied to the gender assumed by English words in German. A list of nearly four hundred words, which the author had gathered from various sources, was presented. These were grouped, and the grammatical gender was

discussed from different points of view. The results of the study may be summed up in brief as follows: The gender has been determined 1. by the influence of German cognates or synonyms, 2. by terminations, 3. by class or character of objects, 4. occasionally by fancy or chance. While agreeing to a certain extent with the principles of the Adelung-Grimm and Brugmann theories, the author maintained that Wheeler is undoubtedly nearest to the truth, in his claim that grammatical gender is an imperfect blending of two systems of classification, the one based on meaning, the other on form.

The paper by Prof. Guido Stempel of the University of Indiana on "Chaucer's Narrative Art" was not read owing to the absence of the essayist, and his failure to send his paper.

Then followed Prof. Herman S. Piatt of the University of Illinois on "The Dramatic Function of the *Confident* in the Tragedies of Corneille and Racine." The three pseudo-Aristotelian unities, along with certain other less important, but no less rigid conventional limitations, had the effect of banishing all real action from the seventeenth century tragic stage. Not only the physical events of the play, but also the psychic episodes had to be made known to the spectators through the medium of narration. This necessitated the employment of some character whose study it should be to impart or receive this narration. As much which the hero or heroine had to impart partook of the nature of the delicate personal confidences, this character must be conceived to stand in close personal relations with the principal, and yet must not be of sufficient social importance to require a leading part to be created for him in the plot. No character of real life fulfilled these conditions. Hence arose the *confident*. The character of real life which came nearest to fulfilling the conditions was the *gouverneur* or *gouvernante*. This is the forerunner of the *confident* in Corneille.

Corneille's attitude toward the *confident* is throughout tentative and experimental. He tries first to enlarge its functions, to relieve it of its artificiality, and to create for it a real place in the intrigue. In doing this, he uses it most effectively as a moral background, in order to throw into relief, and emphasize the essential attributes of the principal character.

This is notably the case with the *gouvernantes-confidentes* of the *Cid*. In his later tragedies his tendency is to eliminate more and more the character from the plot; also to abandon the name *confident*, and to conceal the character under other titles. There is clearly marked throughout Corneille's tragedies a distaste for the conventional, professional *confident*.

Racine accepts the *confident* more complacently, as he does the other literary conventions of his time. He does not hesitate to make generous use of the rôle whenever it suits his purpose to do so, and is not ashamed of the name. He accepts it, too, in all its artificiality, and does not undertake to enlarge its functions, or to make it a psychic force in itself for the elaboration of plot or character.

In the absence of Prof. Glen L. Swiggett of Purdue University, his paper entitled "An Interpretation of Faust i, ll. 1607-1626" was not read. The report of the committee of the main body, Prof. E. H. Magill, Chairman, to report on the condition and prospects of the International Correspondence, and on the advisability of establishing a central bureau to obtain correspondents for American students and instructors, was read by Prof. T. A. Jenkins. The report describes the constitution of the French Committees, called particular attention to the successful work of the Leipzig bureau, and urged the need of organizing the work in this country by the appointment of a standing committee.

On Thursday evening the members of the Association were socially received by the faculty of Vanderbilt University, in the parlors of Wesley Hall.

The first paper read on Friday was by Prof. James T. Hatfield and Miss Elfrida Hochbaum of Northwestern University. It was read by Prof. Hatfield; subject, "The Direct Influence of the American Revolution upon German Poetry." At the time of the American revolution, a spirit was abroad in Germany which manifested itself in literature by attacks upon tyrants, and by a general enthusiasm for freedom. Thus a way was prepared for American ideals, which were eagerly greeted and loudly praised, by the poets of the time. For some time America, as a country, has been well known to the Germans. The American movement was

looked up to as the highest expression of the general desire for liberty, and as largely the cause of the desire—as testified by Goethe.

It is evident from the journals of the time, that the progress of the war was watched with sympathetic attention, both for its own sake and still more because of its probable effect in regenerating European politics.

The sale of German mercenaries to England was felt to be a degradation, and was frequently assailed in poetry.

The American revolution found its warmest sympathizers among the poets of Germany. Especially enthusiastic were the members of the Göttingen group. F. L. Stolberg, in his fragmentary poem *Die Zukunft*, gave fullest expression of his sympathy for the American cause. Klopstock, Schubart, Klinger, Voss, and many other poets praise the cause of American liberty, and mention it with enthusiasm. Not only the cause but its leaders, such as Franklin and Washington, received high tributes. American ideals and institutions were contrasted with those prevalent in France, to the great advantage of the former.

"The Italian Sonnet in English" was the subject of a paper read by Dr. E. E. Severy of the Bowen Academic School of Nashville. The paper consisted of an enumeration of the sonnet writers in English from the time of its introduction by the Earl of Surrey down to the present time, and a classification according to legitimacy or illegitimacy in form, as compared with the Italian sonnet.

In the paper entitled "Some Points of Similarity between Hauff's *Lichtenstein* and Scott's *Ivanhoe*" by Dr. Clarence W. Eastman of the University of Iowa, the author endeavored to show that Hauff did not follow Scott merely along certain broad and general lines, but that in writing *Lichtenstein* he was materially influenced by *Ivanhoe* in working out details of plot and situation. Certain parallelisms of characters, *Ivanhoe*—Georg von Sturmfeder, Richard—the Duke of Würtemberg, Rowena—Marie, Rebecca—Bärbele, as well as similarity in certain incidents, seem to show that if Hauff was not consciously influenced by *Ivanhoe*, it must at least have been very fresh in his mind at the time when he was engaged in writing *Lichtenstein*.

The paper on the "English Gerund" by Prof. W. L. Weber of Emory College, Oxford, Ga., defined the gerund as a verbal derivative in *-ing* having the function of both noun and verb, in that it may be qualified by an adverb, and have an object in the case which a verb would require. To the gerundial infinitive are to be given over gerundial constructions of form not in *-ing*. The origin of the construction is to be sought in the attempt to reproduce the ablative case of the Latin gerund. It was shown that the Latin construction is consistently reproduced by the *-ung (ing)* noun, or by the present participle in *ende*. Especially do the 'Psalter' translations—as well as the earlier glosses, bear witness to the A. S. origin of the gerund.

"The Dialectical Provenience of Scandinavian Loan-words in English, with Special Reference to Lowland Scotch" by Dr. George T. Flom of Vanderbilt University, was next presented. When the Norse and Danish population in England and Scotland merged into the native English, it brought with it a host of Norse and Danish words that have, in a large measure, persisted down to the present time. By the study of the form and meaning of these words, as they appear in the older literature and in the northern dialects, we can determine their dialectical provenience, and by a further study of their distribution, it is possible to localize the two Northern races in England and Scotland. Brate showed that the Scandinavian elements in the *Ormulum* are predominantly Danish, but the existence of certain Norse-words in Midland works proves that the settlements even so far South were not exclusively Danish. Brate's is the only attempt hitherto of determining the exact Northern source of Scandinavian loanwords in Middle English. Arnold Wall (Cambridge University, England), who has made a study of the loan-word elements in the dialects of England, considers the question of dialectical provenience one that cannot be settled. Dr. Flom, however, through an examination of Scottish literature from Barbour to Burns, inclines to the view that the general character of loan-words in Scotch is Norse not Danish. This view is supported by the fact that, 1. a number of words in Scotch do not exist at all in Danish or have in Scottish a distinctively Norse sense; 2. a number of

words have in Scotch a form that is West Scandinavian.

A brief summary of Miss Katherine Merrill's paper on "The Beginning of Thackeray's *Pendennis*," was read by Prof. F. A. Blackburn. The paper was a study of literary construction, and showed that the lack of plot and movement in Thackeray's novels was due to the sketchy nature of his mind so that the result afforded brilliant bits of conversation, but that the general effect of the whole was broken and interrupted.

At the close of this session the report of Prof. Pearson of Beloit, in behalf of the committee on nominations, was adopted and the following officers were elected: President, Prof. Charles Bundy Wilson, Univ. of Iowa; Sec.-Treas., Prof. H. Schmidt-Wartenberg, Univ. of Chicago; First Vice-Pres., Prof. T. Atkinson Jenkins, Vanderbilt Univ.; Second Vice-Pres., Prof. F. A. Blackburn, Univ. of Chicago; Third Vice-Pres., Prof. C. F. McClumpha, Univ. of Minnesota; Members of the Council, Prof. Raymond Weeks, Univ. of Missouri, Prof. C. C. Ferrell, Univ. of Miss., Prof. Julius Goebel, Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ., Prof. M. W. Sampson, Univ. of Indiana.

Prof. Ferrell spoke briefly concerning Dr. Baskervill, late Prof. of English at Vanderbilt Univ., and presented appropriate resolutions, which were adopted and entered on the records of the Association. Dr. Florer of the Univ. of Michigan paid a brief tribute to the memory of Prof. George A. Hench, and similar resolutions were adopted and placed on the minutes.

The last session was opened by the reading of a summary of a paper entitled "New Facts concerning Udall's Life and Works," by Prof. Ewald Flügel of Leland Stanford Jr. University. The paper itself will probably appear in the near future as an introduction to an edition of Udall's works.

"Sherwood Bonner, Story Writer and Novelist" was the subject of a paper read by Prof. Alexander L. Bondurant of the Univ. of Miss. Katherine Sherwood Bonner's instinct in choosing the material for her stories from her home, life in the south was certainly not at fault, as her friend and adviser, Longfellow, was obliged to confess. She seems to be the first writer of

the negro dialect story, and though she does not manifest that care in the treatment of dialect that we see in Page and Harris, no writer who has followed her has apprehended more fully the negro character. One character in particular, the old southern mammy, she has portrayed with a faithfulness and beauty equaled by no other writer. Of her novel of the reconstruction period, *Like Unto Like*, a reviewer in the *Boston Courier* speaking for New England wrote:

"The main thing is that Sherwood Bonner has seized the transition period of the feeling between the North and the South so perfectly that her book will probably stand in the future as the best representative of this episode of the national life."

The paper by Prof. Edward S. Joynes of South Carolina College on "Dictation and Composition in Modern Language Teaching" was presented at both the New York and the Nashville meeting. It consisted of a plea for a larger place for dictation work in elementary instruction on account of the combination of faculties, eye, ear, and hand. The giving up of too large a portion of time to the learning of paradigms did not seem advisable to the essayist. In the discussion that followed, the question was raised as to the advisability of devoting more time at the meetings to questions of a purely pedagogical nature.

"The Discussion of Some Questions Raised by the Report of the Committee of Twelve," elicited only a brief discussion. On the motion of Prof. Hatfield, the following resolution was adopted:

"Resolved that the Central Division of the Modern Language Association of America indorses the report of the Committee of Twelve for Modern Language Requirements in German and French."

Owing to the shortness of time, the two last papers were limited to eight minutes each. The paper of Dr. W. W. Florer of the University of Michigan on "The Change of Gender from Middle-High-German to Luther, as Shown by the Bible Edition of 1545" was one which, in spite of the limitation in regard to time, presented many points of interest. It showed that about three hundred substantives show change of gender from the Middle-High-German period with manifold complications of

detail. These changes are due in large part to a confusion in the weak declension owing to similarity of form in mas. and fem. ending; in less degree to the tendency to give the same gender to the words belonging in the same class or category.

The object of the paper entitled "The Syntax of the Verb in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, 787-1001 A. D." by Prof. Hugh M. Blain of the Speers-Langford Military Institute, was to produce a working syntax of the Verb in Anglo-Saxon. The paper was read only in part, and was confined principally to a general outline of chapter headings.

On the motion of Prof. Wilson, a resolution was adopted expressing appreciation of the efforts of the reception committee of Vanderbilt University. A note taken to obtain an expression of opinion in regard to the place for the joint meeting next December, showed the following order in preference, Washington, Philadelphia, New York and Baltimore. The Secretary was empowered to act for the Central Division in making arrangements for the joint meeting.

CLARENCE WILLIS EASTMAN.

University of Iowa.

JOHANN RAUTENSTRAUCH AND GOETHE'S *Götz*.

RAUTENSTRAUCH, the Viennese poet and controversialist,¹ has recently been honored by a special biographical study.² Its author, Dr. Eugen Schlesinger, has performed his task with diligence and accuracy in the gathering and reporting of facts. He has, however, utterly failed in evolving from his studies a life-like picture of Rautenstrauch's personality and activity. For that, his method of treatment is, on the one hand, not incisive and suggestive enough; on the other hand, too mechanical, one is tempted to say, "reportorial." Not only is the style of the book very unattractive, but the author seems to scorn the most elementary principles of grouping, emphasis and perspective, in a word, everything that helps to change

¹ Cf. Goedeke's *Grundriss*,² iv, 111, and vi, 529.

² Dr. Eugen Schlesinger: *Johann Rautenstrauch* (geb. 1746, gest. 1801). *Biographischer Beitrag zur Geschichte der Aufklärung in Oesterreich*. Wien, 1897. 8vo, 147 pp.

a series of facts into an organic and attractive whole.

Fortunately this need not be a cause of undue regret to the student of German literature, for Rautenstrauch, whatever may have been his influence in Austria as a champion of the reformatory efforts of Joseph II, cannot claim any particular prominence in the literary movements of his time.

A few facts suggested by a study of Dr. Schlesinger's book are, however, not without interest in connection with the general study of German literature during the second half of the eighteenth century, and may, therefore, be briefly mentioned here.

1. When in May 1770 the archduchess Marie Antoinette passed through Strassburg, Rautenstrauch composed a poem *Der glücklichste* (Goedeke: *glückliche*) *Frühling*, etc., which received a prize and, printed on satin, was presented to the princess. This fact is of some interest in as far as Goethe prominently speaks of the visit of Marie Antoinette in the beginning of the ninth book of *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, and there tells us that he wrote his last French poem on that occasion (*Werke*, Weimar ed., vol. 27, 242). Rautenstrauch did not leave Strassburg for Vienna until the fall of 1770. His prize poem, as well as former publications, must have given him some prominence in literary circles in Strassburg, and it would be of interest to know whether he was connected with Salzmann's *Gesellschaft*, and acquainted with Goethe. No such possibility, however, is thought of by Dr. Schlesinger, who does not even mention Salzmann or Goethe, and here, as elsewhere, avoids everything that might broaden and enliven his treatment and awaken interest in his protégé.

2. Rautenstrauch published in 1778 *Kriegslieder für Josefs Heere*, called forth by the then threatening war of the Bavarian Succession. They almost challenge comparison with Gleim's *Preussische Kriegslieder* and their imitations by Weisse, Gerstenberg, and others. No such thought suggests itself, however, to Dr. Schlesinger. And yet, even a casual comparison of the specimens printed by him with Gleim's *Kriegslieder* furnishes conclusive proof of the direct influence of the latter; for even these few specimens contain several in-

stances of striking verbal correspondence, while the metre in which they are written is identical with that used by Gleim, the famous stanza of the Chevy Chase ballad, which, through the *Spectator*, had found its way into Germany long before Percy's *Reliques*. According to Sauer, Pröhle in his *Kriegsdichter des siebenjährigen Krieges und der Freiheitskriege*, Leipzig, 1857, traces the use of this particular stanza as a metre for war lyrics from Gleim to the period of the war of German independence. Whether he has included Rautenstrauch in his discussion, I cannot tell. So much is certain, however, that the latter's war songs of 1778 are among the direct descendants of Gleim's *Kriegslieder*.

3. As a dramatic writer Rautenstrauch deserves to be remembered as the author of at least one comedy, *Der Jurist und der Bauer*, Vienna, 1773, which was popular not only in Vienna, but at almost all theatrical centres in Germany: Mannheim, Berlin, Hamburg, Weimar (Cf. Goethe, *Tag- und Jahreshefte*, 1802; *Werke*, Weimar ed., vol. 35, 128). One would, therefore, like to know how the comedies of Rautenstrauch, and this one in particular, compare with those of his contemporaries, for instance, Chr. Fel. Weisse and the Austrians Ayrenhoff (especially his *Postzug*) and Stephanie d. J. But again, one is disappointed. There can, however, be little doubt that, like them, Rautenstrauch in his comedies directly followed French models and traditions, despite Lessing's *Minna*.

4. Goedeke's bibliography of Rautenstrauch will have to undergo some changes and additions as a result of Dr. Schlesinger's monograph. So much the more is it to be regretted that the latter has not himself compiled, as an appendix, a complete chronological bibliography of his author's writings.

5. The foregoing paragraphs, in all likelihood, would never have been written, were it not for the interesting fact that in Dr. Schlesinger's biographical sketch we find attention called to a hitherto unnoticed contemporary review of Goethe's *Götz*.

During the years 1774/75 Rautenstrauch edited, and probably wrote himself, *Die Meinungen der Babet. Eine Wochenschrift*. In it is found a short article on Goethe's *Götz*

which is not contained in Braune's *Goethe im Urtheile seiner Zeitgenossen*. Since in Dr. Schlesinger's monograph it is not likely to be very generally noticed, it may be appropriate to reprint it here as far as it is of interest (Schlesinger, pp. 113-4).

"Die seltenste und wichtigste Erscheinung unsrer Zeiten. Herr Goethe, Doctor juris in Frankfurt am Main, ist der Verfasser. Er nennt es ein Schauspiel: dies ist es auch, aber nur zum Lesen, und trotz der Nachricht, dass es zu Berlin aufgeführt worden, kann ich mir kaum die Möglichkeit davon vorstellen, wenigstens würde ich um das Vergnügen, es in der Vorstellung gesehen zu haben, hundert andere Ergötzlichkeiten gerne vermissen wollen. Man darf es zehnmal lesen und wird nicht satt werden, und noch dann wird man schwerlich daran denken können, dass der Verfasser sich über alle dramatischen Regeln hinweggesetzt hat.

Dieses Stück hat einen Dialog voller Natur, Auftritte voller Empfindungen, handelnde Personen voller erhabenen und gleichwohl ungekünstelten Denkungsart, und das Ganze reisst die Einbildungskraft der Leser mit sich fort, ebenso mächtig, ebenso stark als Shakespeare's Schauspiele. . . . Die Geschichte und die Personen dieser Handlung sind historisch wahr und machen einen desto stärkeren Eindruck auf die Seelen der Leser. Stoff zu mehreren Schauspielen liegt in diesem Drama. Es hat allenthalben Vertheidiger und Tadler gefunden, aber jeder Tadler bemerkt nur, dass es nicht aufzuführen sei, und jedes Lob sagt, der Autor sei ein ausserordentliches Genie.

Der *Deutsche Mercur* hat von allen kritischen Schriften am gründlichsten davon geurtheilt. Er nennt es ein Stück, worin alle drei Einheiten auf das Grausamste gemisshandelt werden, das weder Lust=noch Trauerspiel ist: und doch das schönste, interessanteste Monstrum, gegen welches man hundert von unseren komischen, weinerlichen Schauspielen austauschen möchte, deren Verfasser dafür sorgen, dass der Puls ihrer Leser nicht aus seinem gewöhnlichen Gange gebracht und ihre Nerven von keinem fieberhaften Anfall schauernder Empfindungen ergriffen werden. . . . Wenn doch nur der Verfasser dieses Stücks den Wünschen seiner Leser und den unparteiischen Erinnerungen des *Deutschen Mercur's* Gehör gebe! Wenn er einmal etwas regelmässig unternähme! Wenn er die Geschichte zweier Personen zum dramatischen Stoff wählte, welche ohnlängst so grosses Aufsehen machten [Frederick and Maria Theresa?]. Was könnte man von ihm nicht erwarten?"

The critique, it is seen, furnishes no novel point of view for our knowledge of the reception of *Götz* at the hands of contemporary

critics. Not only in the passage directly quoted, but also in almost all other particulars, it follows the review which appeared in Wieland's *Der Teutsche Merkur* for September 1773 (Wieland's reply of June 1774 had evidently not yet been seen by Rautenstrauch).

On the other hand, it must not be overlooked that the review in Rautenstrauch's journal appeared in Vienna, and in 1774, that is, at a time when the Austrian capital, unlike German literary centres, was still the unchallenged stronghold of French literary standards and traditions. Of the approximately thirty notices concerning *Götz* that are printed in Braun, all hail from Germany proper, not one from Austria. This circumstance alone lends a certain interest and significance to the review in Rautenstrauch's magazine; and this interest is further increased by the fact that the date of the first performance of *Götz* in Vienna and the gradual change, in the literary life of that city, from French to English standards, have been objects of special inquiry in recent years.

It had long been supposed that the first presentation of *Götz* in a Vienna theatre occurred in 1810 (so still in Winter-Kilian's *Zur Bühnengeschichte des Götz von Berlichingen*, 1891, and in Nollen's *Goethe's Götz von Berlichingen auf der Bühne*, 1893); then the year 1808 was credited with that event, until Horner recently showed (*Beilage zur Allg. Ztg.* 1897, no. 123) that *Götz* was performed in Vienna at the *Kärntnertheater* as early as 1783, hence at the very time when Ayrenhoff and Schink were carrying on their heated discussion concerning the supremacy of the regular French drama or of Shakespeare and his imitators (Cf. *Goethe-Jahrbuch* xix, 293 f., and E. Horner, *Das Aufkommen des englischen Geschmacks in Wien*, *Euphorion* ii, 556 ff. and 782 ff.).

Horner, in the interesting article just mentioned, does not find any direct manifestations of the "English taste" in matters of the theatre and drama until the very end of the seventies. In 1774, at any rate, it would seem that Vienna, in as far as it did not continue to be pleased by farcical comedy and the blood-and-thunder form of tragedy, was entirely dominated by the 'correct' French standards of writers like Joh. Elias Schlegel, Weisse, Cronegk and Ayrenhoff. So much the more, however, does Rau-

tenstrauch deserve credit for his early and enthusiastic praise of the 'English' *Götz*; and one is tempted to connect it with the literary satire which in the very next year Ayrenhoff in his *Gelehrte Frau* directed against Shakespeare and Shakespearean tendencies.

But of these or similar considerations that might make Rautenstrauch's critique more than an isolated fact of no particular interest, there again is not even a suggestion in Dr. Schlesinger's book. The critique is reprinted; that is all. And further, that is practically all that we learn about Rautenstrauch's *Wochenschrift*. For while Dr. Schlesinger devotes several pages to the very uninteresting external history of the short-lived journal, we learn nothing about the spirit and tendencies of its contents. This one must regret, for the journal was largely devoted to literature and the theatre, and the *Götz* review characterizes Rautenstrauch as one of the early champions of the new English taste in Vienna. One would, therefore, like to know more about his attitude in the animated literary and theatrical discussions of that day. That, however, remains "ein frommer Wunsch."

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WORDSWORTH'S REALISM.

I.

THE subject of realism has received so much treatment that a fresh attempt to handle the word may seem superfluous. The discussion, however, has not much undertaken the detailed study of individual writers, being chiefly concerned with the general characteristics of the subject. Many critics have eloquently defended or objected to the whole matter; others have been content to treat this or that phase; while the coma of the word, made up of much loose hasty writing, is a long penumbrous mass apparently incapable of being condensed, and either clearly united to its nucleus or separated from it. Words are thus comet-like, to use Prof. Dowden's figure, because of the great complexity, and perhaps because of implied inconsistency in the ideas they include. Abundant complexity is found in the word realism, and as it is generally used, inconsistency also.

Regrettable as this is, it is not likely to be cured by an attempt either to give new meanings to the word, or to restrict much those it now has. The most that may be done is to differentiate where necessary, and to avoid inconsistency where possible. To thresh the straw once again, therefore, of the controversy over realism and idealism is unnecessary. Certain things may be taken as agreed upon—conclusions reached by mere force of necessity; and they may here be set forth very briefly. Everyone must admit that realism, if by it is meant exact reproduction of life, is manifestly absurd. Art at best, even in its mere materials, cannot be more than illusion. The presence, too, of subjectivity is unavoidable; the artist cannot escape some modification of his material. On the other hand, the inevitable presence of some degree of nature-imitation is just as evident. Forms and ideas do not spring up from nothing, they come from experience and appeal to experience. Thus there is a primitive conflict and also a primitive reconciliation, between realism and idealism. Both elements are necessarily present in any human product. But these facts being granted and put out of the discussion, there still remains sufficient difficulty to give the word reasonable elasticity and consistency. Because, though we may arbitrarily set aside this fundamental conflict, it constantly surprises us nevertheless, necessitating more arbitrary restrictions and distinctions, until, perhaps, the whole carefully wrought system must be criticized as artificial and misleading. A critic's best hope lies in making a few large divisions and holding to them for his purpose, but realizing also that in a scale of difference having a great number of degrees a colleague may find it convenient to emphasize other degrees and establish a different system.

One thing seems generally agreed on,—that the determining mark of realism is the desire to reproduce actuality. Bound up with this desire is the purpose for which the reproduction is made. For convenience in theoretical discussion, literary works may be separated according to the prevalent purpose, and in practise also there is a somewhat clear line of demarcation. Realism may imitate nature for the pleasure found in close reproduction; be-

cause of the delight in fact. For this purely æsthetic purpose and result no one name is generally accepted. Again, realism may imitate nature for some further didactic or non-æsthetic purpose. For this, didactic realism is the best expression now in use. Though no distinguishing nomenclature exists for the two kinds of realistic art thus produced, the main difference between them is easily perceptible, and the generic principle underlying each is the same,—desire for accurate imitation of the actual or of what seems to be the actual. To this principle of nature-imitation is opposed one equally generic, nature-modification—idealism. Here too, the same difference of purpose, resulting in two distinct though unnamed kinds of art, is easily recognizable. Nature is modified, for better or worse, to derive from it greater pleasure,—the æsthetic purpose; or it is modified to enforce a lesson or a belief. Thus both realism and idealism may be doctrinaire and dogmatic, or they may be content to remain æsthetic. An intellectual element is what is added to the æsthetic in the case of either; and sometimes there is so just a balance between the emotional element and the intellectual, that the result is superior to either constituent, and becomes a complex æsthetic yet unified and philosophical whole.

Realism in the literature preceding Wordsworth was much less self-conscious, less severely consistent and logical, than realism of today, because realistic theory in art had not been carried to the extreme conclusions to which the scientific and positivist thought of this century has brought it. Such uncompromising artists and thinkers have been won, in France at least, to the cause of realism, that a realistic æsthetics is now to some degree formulated. Because of these facts it is desirable to study the subject of realism in Wordsworth from the standpoint of the present development, in order to decide what in him is properly included under this head. Accordingly, realistic theory as spoken of in this paper, will in general be understood to refer to the ideas and the practice of realists of the last thirty years. The leading notions of recent realism may be given in a few words.

Since nature-imitation, whatever its purpose, is admitted to be the controlling principle of realism, two corollary principles are at once

evident. The first of these is the importance of nature, with whatever the word includes; not only nature and life, but all nature and all life. The distinction between good and bad, strong and weak, rich and poor, is little regarded. The function of the realist, as he thinks, is not to judge, but to reproduce. Nature is to be the model, the law-giver, and is to have all its elements revered because they belong to nature. The second corollary, of equal rank with the first, is the importance of accurate reproduction. Nature and life appear in unarranged, fragmentary, and unintegrated forms. Men feel inclined to order, unify, and complete. But this means to change nature and produce something different, and it is thus opposed to the imitative principle. Again the realist regards it as his function not to harmonize, unify, and legitimate, but to reproduce. This seems to be the present imitative theory. But in practice there is restriction and rejection. The primitive conflict, too, between the imitative and the modificative impulses is apparent, and the actual result is always a compromise. Man's intellect is of course part of the nature to be represented. In practice, however, the realist tends to avoid intellectual operations because as a rule he distrusts them. What he can test with his senses he is usually more willing to accept as true, both for himself and others; and thus he is more concerned with the impressions made on his senses than with the after-effects of these on his intellect. Much of his material is therefore sensuous, and even though he subjects it to some utilitarian and hence intellectual purpose, he nevertheless often omits a large portion of experience that is as much a part of nature as is what he uses. In his fear of modifying and thus falsifying his sense-impressions, he tends to confine himself to these, and to condemn art not so confined as untrue. Sensible reality comes thus to be the great reality, and he is likely to question the existence or the value of any other kind. At the same time, while the realist's tendency is thus to regard as outside his domain the higher intellectual and emotional workings of the mind, he is nevertheless compelled to admit a good degree of the mental operation of selection, harmonizing, and unifying.

The truth, accordingly, appears to be that

the reader may expect not only varied approximation to reality, but equally varied approximation to the theory of imitation. How, indeed, may we expect to find agreement to any rigid standard among writers so different as Maupassant, Meredith, Henry James, Tolstoi, Zola? Yet all these have certain clear marks of realism, all are deeply interested in the actual facts of human life, and all have some notion of being true to those facts, whether or not they have ever put forth their ideas in any set theory. To sift out the imitative from the modifying impulses and effects in any author's work is a difficult task, and its result at best somewhat uncertain. He may be closely analytical and investigative in method, yet he may apply this method to highly-wrought emotional states, which according to the limitation given the word by practice and by positivist thought, are not realistic. The same analytical method may be applied to high society—a phase of life somewhat tabooed by realism. Again, an author may present commonplace matter drawn from low life, but subject it to the demands of plot and story interest. The first questions, then, that have to be asked in undertaking to classify any author are whether he may be called realist at all; if so, whether he is realistic in matter, or in method of presentation; and whether possibly the word belongs to him by double right.

Although, in the analysis of Wordsworth's poetry, to take the retrospective point of view above indicated makes the degree of realism seem indeed small, yet it affords a few standards that may indicate nevertheless some true conclusions as to the extent and the character of his realism. It is not expected, of course, that realistic traits will be found predominant. Any unprejudiced student of Wordsworth at once admits that, however much imitation of fact he shows, yet the atmosphere which in all his good work surrounds the fact is highly subjective and idealistic.

One of the most noticeable things on viewing Wordsworth from the standpoint of realism is the realistic element in his theory of poetry. The student, therefore, naturally turns to the question of the extent and the importance of this element. A sentence or two from the famous Preface to the *Lyrical Ballads* (1800) in-

cludes much of the realism as well as the idealism of Wordsworth as they are actually revealed in his poetry.

"The principal object proposed in these poems," he says, "was to choose incidents and situations from common life, and to relate or describe them . . . in a selection of language really used by men."

So far he is realistic in both subject and manner; for modern realism, if not logically, at least historically, concerns itself much with common life and aims at conversational style. But Wordsworth goes further. He wishes also "to throw over them a certain coloring of imagination,"—at this the recent realist might pause, for he distrusts imagination,—"whereby ordinary things should be presented to the mind in an unusual aspect." This the realist would condemn on the ground that the unusual aspect would probably not exist in the thing, but be the working of the author's own mind, and also on the ground that the ordinary thing in its ordinary aspect is truer and more valuable. What follows,—

"to make these incidents and situations interesting by tracing in them . . . the primary laws of our nature: chiefly, as far as regards the manner in which we associate ideas in a state of excitement,"—

would probably be accepted or rejected according to the bias of individual realists. Having stated thus in brief his theory, Wordsworth goes on to expound it. In his exposition are found elements that seem to carry him away from realism rather than toward it. Realists may indeed choose to portray "humble and rustic life," but hardly in the belief that "in that condition the essential passions of the heart find a better soil in which they can attain their maturity." They will rather choose it because, as in the case of Miss Wilkins or Mr. Hamlin Garland, that is what they have known with direct and first-hand knowledge. The realist of today is likely to say that if in humble and rustic life "our elementary feelings coexist in a state of greater simplicity," this is because the feelings themselves are not much developed, refined, and differentiated. That, therefore, if their simplicity allows 'more easy contemplation and communication,' yet the manifestations of them are coarse and broad.

As for the 'manners of rural life germinating from those elementary feelings,' realistic works would seem to show that the manners of humble rural life are much more likely to be the result of oppressive monotonous labor—toil so continuous that even the elementary feelings seem to sink out of sight, or to become crusty, almost excrescent. And if they "are more easily comprehended, and are more durable," it is in part due to this stagnant growth. The last statement made by Wordsworth, that "in that condition the passions of men are incorporated with the beautiful and permanent forms of nature," the realist would in the case of most rustics positively deny. From this exposition of his theory concerning his material, the poet passes on to similar exposition concerning the medium of presentation "The language, too, of these men (rustics) has been adopted, purified indeed from what appear to be its real defects."¹ Realistic theory dictates the use of rustic language—and allows, too, some modification of it—in the portrayal of rustic life; but hardly otherwise. The same desire of the realist to be true to the language of the rustic when depicting him, leads to imitation of the language of the factory-worker when depicting him. But it must be at once admitted that in the point of literary medium, Wordsworth's theory and present realistic theory, though allied, stand far apart. In this case Wordsworth was not seeking truth of individual fact, as the realist is likely to be. He was seeking for a literary medium that should be true to the fact in the sense of giving no false refinement and tinsel decoration. In his theory of poetic diction Wordsworth was far less realist than anti-classicist. His encomium on the language of rustics is to be regarded as a mistake in his effort to find a medium at once vigorous, poetical, and sincere; one that could express "truth carried alive into the heart by passion."² On no part of his theory did Wordsworth insist more than on the use of "the real language of men."³ But he was of course not using the phrase with scientific accuracy, and the various limitations and prepossessions involved in his understanding of it have long ago been exposed by Coleridge. At the same time, however, though the con-

¹ Preface to *Lyrical Ballads*, 1800.

² Preface to *Lyrical Ballads*, 1800.

nection between Wordsworth's theory of poetic diction and realism may not be considered close, a connection clearly exists, and exists despite the fact that his theory, bound up as it is with his belief in the value of rustic simplicity, leads to effects in some of his poems as false in their way, perhaps, as the pseudo-refinement he rejects.

Comparison of Wordsworth's theory with that of realism of today would thus seem to show that, so far as regards his choice of common and rustic life for his subject, he is realistic; but in his reasons for the choice, in the qualities he expects to find in his subject, he does not agree with realistic theory. Again, in his insistence on using the real language of men he approaches the theory of realism, though his artistic sense and his subjective philosophic thought keep him in his best work far from the limitations of either his own or the realistic theory.

The result of this comparison suggests what I believe to be the truth, that Wordsworth's realism is incidental, and is subordinated to purposes not claimed by theoretical realism. Realistic at times he certainly is; yet, in general theory and purpose, and in much of his best most characteristic work, he is idealistic and transcendental. It becomes, accordingly, an interesting and fruitful study to trace in his poetry the operation of these two principles; to see how again and again some trait of realism appears, and yet how he often builds on a realistic base a most idealistic superstructure; how from a sensation vividly, realistically described, he reaches a complex emotion that few would claim as the legitimate material of realism;—to see, as he says

"How Verse may build a princely throne
On humble truth."³

Among the most striking features of modern realism are the use of subjects strictly contemporary and the portrayal of actual and individual persons and scenes with little generalization.

As to date of material, Wordsworth's work separates rather sharply into two large classes. Nearly everything produced before 1812 or 1815 is contemporary in subject, presenting matter

³ *At the Grave of Burns*.

of direct observation; while the work written later than this approximate date is chiefly historical. With the second class it will not be necessary to deal in this paper. For, as Wordsworth's mind hardened with age, he grew more strictly intellectual in his production, and derived less inspiration from immediate and concrete objects.

The leading contemporary subjects include of course both narration and description, and of these the narrative poems will be first considered. A narrative in which the author does not appear has in itself little means of indicating whether or not the figures and incidents are drawn from life. This information, however, is in almost every case supplied by Wordsworth's notes, which, though written much later than the poems, may yet be regarded as accurate. *Guilt and Sorrow*, the poet's first narrative, deals with the time of the American war (1776-81), and parts of the woman's story at least are taken from the experiences of one of his friends, while his own impressions of Salisbury Plain with slight additions furnish the background. Wordsworth is less specific, however, in the introductory note to this poem than in many others. Observe, for example, the exactness in the note on *We Are Seven*,—"the little girl who is the heroine I met within the area of Goodrich Castle in 1793." The old Cumberland beggar he says was "observed, and with great benefit to my own heart, when I was a child;" and it was the 'war of the political economists upon mendicity in all its forms' that aroused the poet in 1798 to record his memory. The detail in the note on *Lucy Gray* is not more remarkable than that in many other cases. Here it mainly concerns the incident, and the chief change in this is reported. In the note on *Resolution and Independence* we read,

"this old man I met a few hundred yards from my cottage, and the account of him is taken from his own mouth. I was in the state of feeling described." 'Vaudracour and Julia' was "faithfully narrated from the mouth of a French lady, who had been an eye-and-ear-witness of all that was done and said. . . . The facts are true; no invention as to these has been exercised, as none was needed."

Many other instances are recorded of the same careful copying from life.

Wordsworth's notes show that in respect to imitation from actual models his narratives fall into three classes. In each of the cases just quoted, for example, there was for the figure, and often for the incident, a single model. Though we are told nothing about the 'Lucy' poems, the internal evidence of deep personal experience is so strong as to suggest the classification of them with this group. Selection is exercised, however, for a number of poems, and composition from several models. With almost any other poet this would be taken for granted, but Wordsworth is too careful to report the sources of his materials to allow vague supposition. In the note on *Michael* we are told that

"the Sheepfold remains . . . the ruins of it. The character and circumstances of Luke were taken from a family to whom had belonged . . . the house we lived in at Townend. . . . The name of The Evening Star was . . . given to . . . another (house) . . . more to the north."

Nothing is said, however, of the model for the great shepherd. *Peter Bell* is a composition; the note records many elements of the incident, though the mental experience of Peter seems to have little correspondence with the models here spoken of. (*The Excursion* presents complex composition in both character and incident. The long introductory note shows with what great care the poet records, years after the writing of the work, not only the sources of his material, but the changes and fusions through which it passed. The character of the Wanderer is a union of Wordsworth's idea of himself and of what actually fell under his "own youthful and subsequent observation."⁴ So the Solitary also is a combination of several men into a type of the revolutionary atheist. He too represents Wordsworth, but represents his period of doubt and despair. The shadowy Pastor was formed on no model, nor does he have any particular substance.)

Again, a detached fact or an idea first attracted the poet's attention, figures and incidents being created to illustrate or embody these, and formed the basis of poems of still another class. Even in such poems one may suppose that vague figures and stories floated

⁴ Note on *The Excursion*.

in the poet's mind, and furnished the necessary outline. These poems are obviously the least imitative, and therefore afford a test of Wordsworth's narrative fancy and power to write when freed from the restraint of fact. Examples of this kind—as shown by the prefatory notes—are *The Reverie of Poor Susan*, *The Thorn*, *The Forsaken Indian Woman*, *The Idiot Boy*. These poems are, in my opinion at least, among Wordsworth's poorest narrative work. They would probably be disregarded today, were it not for the fame that their very poverty has given them. They seem to prove that to Wordsworth truth to fact was no restraint, but a necessary support. They show, too, that to present human figures with power Wordsworth needed not only accurate observation, but—even more—imaginative and impassioned meditation. In this double need lie both his realism and (as the word realism is limited) his idealism also. All his work, indeed, reveals the demand of his nature for these two habits of mind and the activity of them. Wordsworth wrote no good poem that did not spring from both these processes. However detailed and accurate he was in his facts, he threw around them a sentiment and an atmosphere entirely the creation of his own deep feeling. Wherever this atmosphere is lacking, there exists the fact of sense, but no poetry. To this the narratives in question bear witness. In *The Thorn* the human element was from the beginning secondary to the transitory impressiveness of the tree. The woman and her story were invented or adapted to commemorate this; and though the story is in its facts pathetic, its connection with the tree is slight and artificial, and the woman is shadowy. *The Idiot Boy* is really a remarkable instance of bathos. Founded on the odd remark of an idiot and composed "almost extempore,"⁵ this poem seems to be based on neither observation nor meditation, and the result is worthy of its name. These two poems are sufficient in themselves to vindicate the judgment that Wordsworth is peculiarly unfit to transcribe 'impressions,' unless indeed these coalesce at once with previous emotional experience. His creations almost never leap full-statured from his brain, as *The Ancient Mariner* sprang from

⁵ Note, *The Idiot Boy*.

Coleridge. Or compare for only a moment Shelley's peculiar power to incorporate graceful "unbodied" fancies, and Keats's plastic touch! Wordsworth follows the process of nature, and with a plant-like slowness gradually unfolds his flowers in the air and sunshine of high emotion. Then if the impulse seize him to write, the reader may expect something rare, indeed, but not exotic, something vitalized by juices from familiar soil and possessed of medicinal virtues. Of this peculiar vitality there is nothing in the poems under discussion. *The Highland Girl*, *The Solitary Reaper*, and *Resolution and Independence*,—those beautiful transcripts of impressions,—do not contradict what has been said. They rather confirm it; for in them there is precisely that immediate coalescence of the present object with past emotional reflection which makes the exceptional condition just noted, and which renders the object a revelation and living embodiment of the poet's former experience.

That Wordsworth could vitalize men only after imaginative meditation is proved also by *Peter Bell* and *Michael*. The character of the pedlar as still known in Wordsworth's day had, indeed, long appealed to the poet's imaginative sympathy, and it is true, too, that for years he was at work on *Peter Bell*. But Peter the Potter is not such a pedlar as Wordsworth admired; he is a vicious person with coarse and blunted sensibilities, and is really outside the pale of the poet's sympathies. Wordsworth's undramatic and moralizing temper made it impossible that such a man as Peter should attract him from interest in character *per se*; and thus (not having even an individual prototype) Peter is left really little more emotionally synthetized than Goody Blake or Betty Foy; and he is not much superior to them in vividness of portraiture. With *Michael* the case is quite different. The character and circumstances of Luke were drawn, as before noted, from a bit of actual family history. Probably the incidents were not changed much, and the background is such as must have been familiar to Wordsworth from childhood. But where did he get the shepherd—that noble quintessential incarnation of north English pastoral life? The model for Michael is not far to seek. In words that convey an unmistakable

ble impression of depth and grandeur of oft-repeated emotion, Wordsworth tells us where he found him.⁶

"Shepherds were the men that pleased me first; . . .
 . . . images of danger and distress,
 Man suffering among awful Powers and Forms;
 Of this I heard, and saw enough to make
 Imagination restless. . . . Yet, hail to you . . .
 Powers of my native region! . . . Your snows and streams
 Ungovernable, and your terrifying winds,
 That howl so dismally for him who treads
 Companionless your awful solitudes!
 There 'tis the shepherd's task the winter long
 To wait upon the storms, . . . And when the spring
 Looks out, and all the pastures dance with lambs,
 . . . him his office leads
 To watch their goings, whatsoever track
 The wanderers choose. . . .
 . . . A rambling schoolboy, thus,
 I felt his presence in his own domain,
 As of a lord and master, or a power,
 Or genius, under Nature, under God,
 Presiding. . . .
 By mists bewildered, suddenly mine eyes
 Have glanced upon him distant a few steps,
 In size a giant, . . . or, as he stepped
 Beyond the boundary-line of some hill-shadow,
 His form hath flashed upon me glorified
 By the deep radiance of the setting sun;
 Or him have I descried in distant sky,
 A solitary object and sublime,
 Above all height! . . .
 Meanwhile this creature, spiritual almost
 As those of books, but more exalted far, . . .
 Was, for the purposes of kind, a man
 With the most common; husband, father, learned,
 Could teach, admonish; suffered with the rest
 From vice and folly, wretchedness and fear."

Michael is the most typical, the most generalized, yet one of the most vivid and convincing of Wordsworth's personages. He is the only greatly successful figure abstracted from an individual prototype, and he is truly an incarnation for the reason already indicated;—the similarity of numberless emotional experiences, and, owing to the peculiarly powerful effect of these, the gradual imaginative synthesis of them into an embodied type.

Yet the evidence furnished by these poems that Wordsworth needed impassioned meditation for successful narrative is not in opposition to the statement that he is realistic in portrayal. But the word cannot be taken to mean too much; the basic facts of sense being given, sometimes with superabundant detail, there then comes a

6 *The Prelude*, Bk. 8.

point where he rises from these to higher intellectual and particularly emotional states and truths, which, without extending the present meaning of the word, cannot be called realistic. To Wordsworth and to many of his readers, his best works are imbued with a "sense sublime of something far more deeply interfused"⁷ than is externally manifested. His best narratives, as well as his descriptions and his reflective poetry, give clear expression to this feeling; some of his human figures, notably the Highland Girl, being the embodied spirit of their surroundings. These highly-wrought emotions undoubtedly lie outside the bounds of realistic material, though the realistic method may indeed be applied to the presentation of them.

Below this poetically highest work, there is an intermediate grade in which the imitative tendency is still strong, but in which the modifying influence is also vigorous; the complex result being used mainly for ethical purposes. *The Excursion* is full of this kind of writing, both descriptive and narrative. From the standpoint of realism, a less distinct difference exists between this grade of work and that still lower, more prosaic and poor. The didactic purpose runs through both ranks, and much the same kind of material is used, so far as humanity is concerned, the chief difference being one of tone and style.

It becomes evident, therefore, that in seeking for realism in Wordsworth's personages and incidents, the reader finds the poet obeying his own theory rather than the theory of recent realism. He chooses humble and rustic life, to quote once more,

"because in that condition the essential passions of the heart find a better soil . . . because the manners of rural life germinate from those elementary feelings."

In other words, his realism is intended from the beginning to be didactic, ethical; it is not the outside man in rustic life that Wordsworth cares for, but the essential passion that he thinks he finds dominant. He is true to the external object in his picture because he believes that to have his eye "steadily fixed upon his object"⁸ is the duty of the poet. Among

7 *Lines Composed above Tintern Abbey*.

8 *Preface to Lyrical Ballads*, 1800.

the powers requisite for the production of poetry he places first

"those of observation and description,—that is, the ability to observe with accuracy things as they are in themselves, and with fidelity to describe them, unmodified by any passion or feeling existing in the mind of the describer, whether the things depicted be actually present to the senses, or have a place only in the memory."

In this he is unquestionably realistic; but in accordance with his own peculiar purpose and method, he judges immediately this power:

"though indispensable," he says it "is one which he (a poet) employs only in submission to necessity, and never for any continuance of time: as its exercise supposes all the higher qualities of the mind to be passive, and in a state of subjection to external objects, much in the same way as a translator or engraver ought to be to his original. . . . The more exquisite the sensibility is, the more will he be incited to observe objects, both as they exist in themselves and as reacted upon by his own mind."⁹

These sentences distinctly show the relative importance that the powers of imitation and of modification hold in Wordsworth's mind. The first is indispensable, but is nothing without its compeer. Though he insists on getting close to the fact, he is never satisfied to remain there. The "essential passion" pervading it is the real object of his search; and his patient attention to the fact is due to his belief that without this he cannot attain insight into the essential passion. How clearly this is illustrated in the old Leechgatherer! Bodily condition is dwelt on for the sake of a strong moral contrast. Most poets are content to portray the essential passion (as much their own as their creature's) and give merely swift glances at the subject of it. Perhaps the chief reason why Wordsworth is instructive to a student of realism is that he frequently offers along with the passion the unemotionalized basis of it. Or, if not this first stage of his material, he shows a transition from it to the other.) An illustration is found in *Simon Lee*. The first four stanzas furnish nearly enough information to present fully and delicately the pathetic old figure, but to these is added this bit of dead fact:

"And he is lean and he is sick;
His body, dwindled and awry,

⁹ Preface to *Lyrical Ballads*, 1815.

Rests upon ankles swollen and thick;
His legs are thin and dry."

Several stanzas of unimportant detail follow, and then an address to the reader, who, the poet thinks, may expect a tale to be related, but who is requested to make one for himself from like incidents by using such "stores as silent thought can bring." *Simon Lee*, in spite of this awkward interlude, is not altogether a poor poem; but it has the fault common to a great many of Wordsworth's narratives,—the realism is a little absurd, and the ethical purpose, while broad enough, perhaps, is rendered uninteresting by triviality of style. Many of the subjects, too, of these slighter poems remain commonplace; they remain so because the feeling of the person described has reached no great height, as in *The Last of the Flock*; or because the poet has failed to realize the nature or the depth of the passion portrayed, as in *The Forsaken Indian Woman*. Such poems sprang from no depth in Wordsworth's nature, and they reach none in ours. Wordsworth's realism in the field of narrative lies, therefore, in the fact that in the majority of cases he begins with close imitation of both personage and incident; when he attempts to create either, he nearly always fails. But having begun with imitation of the objects presented to his senses, he passes on to emotional reaction on this sense-material, and in this unrealistic activity he finds his chief interest, and displays his greatest power.

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FAUST-INTERPRETATIONS.

I.

WITH regard to the lines in the *Prolog im Himmel*

247 Ihr Anblick giebt den Engeln Stärke,
Wenn keiner sie ergründen mag.

267 Der Anblick giebt den Engeln Stärke,
Da keiner sie ergründen mag.

Düntzer¹ says

"Mit Absicht setzt wohl der Dichter hier statt *wenn* (obgleich), dessen er sich oben bedient hat, *da* (weil); in der Unergründlichkeit des in

¹ Erläuterungen, Faust, Erster Theil, p. 68.

der Welt sich bekundenden Gottes werden sie sich seiner Allmacht bewusst und dadurch gestärkt."

Schröder makes *da=wenn=wenn auch, obgleich*:

"Wenn die Engel auch das Wesen der Sonne nicht ergründen können, so erhebt sie doch ihr Anblick."

Thomas³ says this is hardly possible, and refers to Grimm, *Wb.*, where *da* is not once quoted in that sense. He proposes *since* as the proper meaning. Strehlke, *Wb.*, quoted by Thomas, gives it the meaning of *da wo*.

The difficulties disappear, if we take *wenn*, varied, as Schröder properly intimates, by *da*, not with the now usual hypothetic meaning, but as denoting the co-existence of two co-ordinate facts placed side by side adversatively. In the eighteenth century *wenn* was frequently used in this sense, where now we should use *während*; see Paul, *Wb.*, p. 533, where the following examples are quoted:

"sie führen uns in Gängen voll Nacht zum glänzenden Throne der Wahrheit, wenn Schul-lehrer in Gängen voll eingebildeten Lichts zum düstern Throne der Lügen leiten" (Lessing);

"fehlet Bildung und Farbe doch auch der Blüte des Weinstocks, wenn die Beere, gereift, Menschen und Götter entzückt" (Goethe);

"durch immer schönere Gedankenformen schreitet der philosophische Geist zu höherer Vortrefflichkeit fort, wenn der Brotgelehrte das unfruchtbare Einerlei seiner Schulbegriffe hütet" (Schiller).

By taking *wenn* in this sense we get rid of the strained thought involved in the assumption of a causal or concessive relation between the two clauses.

II.

318 Da dank ich euch; denn mit den Todten
Hab' ich mich niemals gern befangen.

Thomas translates the second line by "I have never cared to concern myself," and adds "This use of *befangen=befassen* is very rare, seemingly a *ἀπαξ λεγόμενον*, so far as Goethe is concerned." Paul, *Wb.*, states its use with Jean Paul to be (*öfters*)=*sich befassen*. The

² Page 18.

³ P. 246.

expression *sich befangen*, however, was quite frequently used in northern Germany during my early years (1860-1870), and I have the impression of an admixture of the meaning of *physical contact* with the meaning of 'concern,' which makes Goethe's expression very vivid.

III.

554 Ja, eure Reden, die so blinkend sind,
In denen ihr der Menschheit Schnitzel kräuselt,
Sind unerquicklich wie der Nebelwind,
Der herbstlich durch die dürren Blätter säuselt!

Hayward translates: "In which ye crisp the shreds of humanity."

Bayard Taylor: "Where ye for men twist shredded thought like paper."

Thomas: "Prink up humanity's leavings, (or, perhaps) twist gewgaws for men."

Bayard Taylor, in a note, justly objects to taking *der Menschheit* as a genitive; yet his "shredded thought like paper" is, I think, far from representing the exact idea. *Schnitzel kräuseln* means "cut up and curl paper" (especially scraps of paper) for ornaments, like for instance, those put round candles to receive their drippings (French *bobèches de papier*); the meaning, then, would be: Your glittering speeches which are humanity's flimsy ornaments.

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NOTE ON THE TIME ANALYSIS OF MACBETH Act iii, Sc. iv—Act. iv, Sc. i.

THE accepted analysis of the time in the last part of the third, and the first part of the fourth act of Macbeth, made by Daniel, in the New Shakspeare Society's *Transactions for 1877-79*, places Act iii, sc. 5, on the same night as Act iii, sc. iv, and supposes that Act iv, sc. i, took place on the following morning. This view is supported by Act iii, sc. iv: 132-133, where Macbeth says:

..... "I will tomorrow,
And betimes I will, to the weird sisters."

The objection to accepting this analysis lies in the fact that Act iii, sc. vi (which Mr. Daniel indeed rejects, perhaps needlessly), evidently

does not take place on the same night as Act iii, sc. iv; for in Act iii, sc. iv, 130, Macbeth says he has heard casually that Macduff denies him his presence, and that he will send to find out whether this is true; while in Act iii, sc. vi, 21-40 Lennox says that Macduff "from broad words and 'cause he failed his presence at the tyrant's feast" lives in disgrace, and has fled to England to make preparations for war. In order to account for this confusion, the suggestion has been offered that Shakspeare added Act iii, sc. vi as an after-thought, in order that the two witch scenes might not follow each other in immediate succession; and that in inserting the scene, he forgot, or purposely neglected, the time of the action. It seems hardly probable that Shakspeare, even though he did not always perform his work with strictest attention to detail, should have committed so inexcusable a blunder. If his only motive had been to separate the witch scenes, his ingenuity could have found some method of doing it which would not have affected so directly the action of the play.

Another solution of the difficulty has been offered and made on the supposition that Macbeth was in the habit of visiting the weird sisters, and that the two scenes described took place on two different occasions; that Act iii, sc. v, is on the same night as Act iii, sc. iv, and that it shows the preparation of the sisters for Macbeth's visit on the morrow; furthermore, that there is an interval between Act iii, sc. v, and Act iii, sc. vi; and that the action of Act iii, sc. vi, and Act iv, sc. i, takes place on succeeding days. This method of interpretation obviates the necessity of explaining the insertion of Act iii, sc. vi, but it does not seem entirely satisfactory; because such an interpretation of the sequence of the scenes leaves the reader in ignorance of what Macbeth considered an important meeting with the witches, and also makes the witches tell him at the second meeting what he would have wanted to find out at the first.

A new suggestion, however, may now be offered, and a different explanation of the time relation of these particular scenes may perhaps be worthy of consideration. This suggestion is an extremely simple one; it depends merely upon a trifling change in the Folio punctuation

of two lines in the scene. In other words, the suggestion is made to place a period after "I will tomorrow" in Act iii, sc. iv, 132; and to omit any mark after "And betimes I will" in line 133. The lines will then read: "I will tomorrow. And betimes I will to the weird sisters;" that is, I will send tomorrow. Punctuating in this way we find that "I will tomorrow" refers to what Macbeth has just said about sending to Macduff; and that the words "And betimes I will" refer to his visit to the weird sisters which is to be made in the near future, but not on the morrow. The interval then will fall between Act iii, sc. iv, and Act iii, sc. v; while Act iii, sc. v—Act iv, sc. i, take place on a later night and the following morning.

The objection may be raised that in this way the reference in Act iii, sc. vi, 21-40, to Macduff and Macbeth, and the second reference to the same events in Act iv, sc. i: 140 sq. would be placed in opposition. This objection is scarcely valid, for although it is true that in arranging the time as Mr. Daniel advocates no question arises of this difficulty, the conflict will be found if the interval be placed between Act iii, sc. v, and Act iii, sc. vi. In the present interpretation and method of analysis of the scenes, and indeed in the second scheme of analysis, the difficulty might be avoided by supposing that "the king" in Act iii, sc. vi, 39, refers, as the Folio seems to indicate, to the English sovereign and not to Macbeth. This may be rather hard to believe since in the next line but one Lennox says: "Sent he to Macduff?" where the "he" plainly means Macbeth. Still, in his intense interest in the question under discussion, it is conceivable that Lennox might speak of the person uppermost in his mind as "he," without considering what reference the pronoun might have to anything which had just preceded. This supposition that it is the King of England, and not Macbeth, who is preparing for war, is further borne out by Macbeth's attitude, in Act iv, sc. i, 140 sq., when he is informed of Macduff's flight. If he had known of the flight before, there would be no excuse for his surprise when he hears of it, and there would be less excuse, granted that the surprise was feigned, for the soliloquy which immediately follows. Nor in this solilo-

quy is it necessary to interpret Macbeth's remark that time had anticipated his dread exploits to mean that he had not yet sent to Macduff. Why could not Shakspeare have wished us to infer that time had prevented Macbeth from meting the same fate to Macduff that he had already done to Duncan and Banquo?

Aside from this question, however, through this new method of dividing the time of the play as suggested, the difficulties of the other two analyses would be done away with, and at the same time advantages of both would be retained. In the first place, the action of Act iii, sc. vi, is thrown into its proper perspective if we imagine the scene to have taken place after Act iii, sc. iv, and yet the scene does not become merely an interpolation marring the harmony of Act iii, sc. v, and Act iv, sc. i. In the second place, if we recognize the interval here we find that the action of Act iii, sc. v, and Act iv, sc. i, is centralized, and not only are we able to see the preparations for that crucial visit of Macbeth, but we are also brought face to face with the visit itself and we can watch the most minute development without being obliged, as in the former case, to piece together two scenes by imagining the sequel to the first and the introduction to the second. If the Macbeth were less a drama of action we might conceive that Shakspeare had given us merely two disconnected scenes, but when, as here, one event is so closely connected with another, and follows it in quickest succession, it is difficult to believe that he would willingly scatter our attention. And so long as this difficulty of the time does exist, it would seem perhaps that the spirit of the play would be less marred and more easily understood by a mere change in the punctuation of a line in the Folio, than by long explanations of what otherwise seems almost inevitable. Some consideration at least may be given to this suggested interpretation and punctuation of the lines Act iii, iv, 132-133: "I will [that is, send] tomorrow. And betimes I will to the weird sisters."

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THE PRESENT STATUS OF RHETORICAL THEORY.

Two opposing conceptions of the nature of dis-

course bequeathed to us from classic times still struggle for dominance in our modern rhetorical theory,—the social conception of Plato and the anti-social conception of the Sophists.¹ The latter, though known to us only fragmentarily from allusions and quotations in later treatises, can be, in its essential outlines, easily reconstructed. According to the sophistic teaching, discourse was simply a process of persuading the hearer to a conclusion which the speaker, for any reason, desired him to accept. Analyzed further, this familiar definition discloses certain significant features.

First of all it conveys, though somewhat indirectly, a notion of the ultimate end of the process of discourse. Why should discourse take place at all? Why should the hearer be persuaded? Because, answers the definition, the speaker wishes to persuade him. And, to pursue the inquiry still further, the speaker wishes to persuade the hearer to a certain belief presumably because he recognizes some advantage to himself in doing so. We should conclude, therefore, from examination of the definition before us, that discourse is for the sake of the speaker.

Nor is this conclusion threatened by further investigation into the pre-Platonic philosophy of discourse. It is true that the practical precepts of the sophistic rhetoricians pay great deference to the hearer, even seeming, at first glance, to exalt him over the speaker. Every detail of the speech is to be sedulously "adapted" to the hearer. Nothing is to be done without reference to him. His tastes are to be studied, his prejudices regarded, his little jealousies and chagrins written down in a book;—but all this, be it remembered, in order simply that he may the more completely be subjugated to the speaker's will. As the definition has previously suggested, the hearer's ultimate importance to discourse is of the slightest. To his interests the process of discourse is quite indifferent.

But not only does persuasion, according to the sophistic notion, fail to consider the interests of the hearer; frequently it even assails them. In fact, the sophistic precepts bristle with implications that the hearer's part in dis-

1. The use of the term "social" in connection with rhetorical theory has been borrowed directly from Prof. F. N. Scott of the University of Michigan; though for the interpretation here put upon the word, he is not necessarily responsible.

course is virtually to be spoiled. The hearer is to be persuaded for the sake of some advantage to the speaker. If his own advantage should chance to lie in the same direction with that of the speaker, the utmost that the process of discourse could do would be merely to point out this fact to the hearer. In such a case little persuasive art is demanded. It is rather when the interests of the hearer, if rightly understood by him, oppose his acceptance of the conclusion urged by the speaker that real rhetorical skill comes into play. Then is the speaker confronted by a task worthy of his training—that of making the acceptance of this conclusion, which is really inimical to the hearer's interests, seem to him advantageous. In plainest statement, the speaker must by finesse assail the hearer's interests for the sake of his own.

This is a typical case of discourse, according to the sophistic conception. Its essentially anti-social character appears both in its conscious purpose and in its unrecognized issues. We have seen that the end it seeks is exclusively individual, sanctioned only by that primitive ethical principle of the dominance of the strong. The speaker through discourse secures his own advantage simply because he is able to do so. The meaning of his action to the hearer or to society as a whole, is purely a moral question with which rhetoric is not directly concerned. There is, in the rhetorical theory of the sophists, no test for the process of discourse larger than the success of the speaker in attaining his own end.

But further, the sophistic conception of discourse is anti-social in its outcome. Instead of levelling conditions between the two parties to the act, as we are told is the tendency in all true social functioning, discourse renders these conditions more unequal than they were before it took place. The speaker, superior at the outset, by virtue at least of a keener perception of the situation, through the process of discourse, comes still further to dominate the hearer. As in primitive warfare the stronger of two tribal organizations subdues and eventually enslaves the weaker, so in discourse the initial advantage of the speaker returns to him with usury.


This anti-social character of the sophistic discourse, as seen both in its purpose and in

its outcome, may be finally traced to the fact that the process, as we have analyzed it, just fails of achieving complete communication between speaker and hearer. Some conclusion is, indeed, established in the mind of the hearer, but not necessarily the conclusion which the speaker himself has reached upon this subject. It may, in fact, oppose all his own experience and thought, and thus hold no organic relation to his own mind. But wishing the hearer to believe it, he picks it up somewhere and proceeds to insert it into the hearer's mind.

This absence of a vital relationship between the normal activities of the speaker's mind and the action by which he seeks to persuade the hearer, breaks the line of communication between the two persons concerned. Conditions at the ends of the circuit cannot be equalized, as in true social functioning, because the current is thus interrupted.

This conception of the process of discourse might be graphically represented in figure :

Figure 1.




The sophistic account of discourse, then, makes it a process essentially individualistic, and thus socially irresponsible. It secures the advantage of the speaker without regard to that of the hearer, or even in direct opposition to it. Because this conception leaves a gap in the chain of communication between the minds of speaker and hearer, it fails to equalize conditions between them. The speaker wins and the hearer loses continually. Discourse is purely predatory,—a primitive aggression of the strong upon the weak. The art of rhetoric is the art of war.

Against this essentially crude and anti-social conception of discourse, Plato seems to have raised the first articulate protest. Discourse is not an isolated phenomenon, he maintained, cut off from all relations to the world in which it occurs, and exempt from the universal laws of justice and right. The speaker has certain

obligations, not perhaps directly to the hearer, but to the absolute truth of which he is but the mouthpiece, to the entire order of things which nowadays we are wont to call society. Discourse is, indeed, persuasion, but not persuasion to any belief the speaker pleases. Rather is it persuasion to the truth, knowledge of which, on the part of the hearer, ultimately advantages both himself and the speaker as well. The interests of both are equally furthered by legitimate discourse. In fact the interests of both are, when rightly understood, identical; hence there can be no antagonism between them.

In respect, then, to the advantage gained by each party to the act of discourse, speaker and hearer stand on a footing of at least approximate equality. In fact the ultimate end of discourse must be, from the Platonic premises, to establish equality between them. Before discourse takes place the speaker has a certain advantage over the hearer. He perceives a truth as yet hidden from the hearer, but necessary for him to know. Since the recognition of this truth on the part of the hearer must ultimately serve the speaker's interests as well, the speaker, through the act of discourse, communicates to the hearer his own vision. This done, the original inequality is removed, the interests of both speaker and hearer are furthered, and equilibrium is at this point restored to the social organism.

It is plain that the circuit of communication between speaker and hearer is in Plato's conception of discourse continuous. The speaker having himself come to a certain conclusion, does not set about establishing another in the hearer's mind, but simply transmits his own belief into the other's consciousness. The connection between the two minds is living and unbroken. The Platonic notion of the process of discourse may be thus illustrated as in figure:



opposing conceptions of discourse delivered to us by the earliest rhetoricians. The changes which they have suffered in the lapse of centuries are surprisingly slight. We find implicit in many of our modern text-books practically the same conception of discourse which was held by the pre-Platonic teachers of rhetoric,—a conception which regards discourse as an act performed by the speaker upon the hearer for the advantage of the speaker alone. It is true that the present-day sophists include in the end of discourse not persuasion alone, but the production of any desired effect upon the hearer. This fact does not, however, modify fundamentally the nature of the process itself. The hearer (or reader as he has now become) is to be interested or amused, or reduced to tears, or overborne with a sense of the sublime, not indeed because the writer himself has previously been interested or amused and, in obedience to the primal social instinct, would communicate his experience to another, but because,—well, because the writer wishes to produce this effect upon the reader. Thus wishing, and being able to gratify his desire, the act of discourse results,—an act still individualistic and one-sided, serving no ends but those of the speaker himself. The effect to be produced upon the hearer, being wholly external to the experience of the speaker, leaves unjoined the old break between speaker and hearer in the process of communication. We have again, in but slightly altered guise, the sophistic conception of discourse.

But in spite of the persistence of this outworn conception in even some recent text-books, there are not wanting many evidences that the Platonic theory of discourse is at last coming home to the modern consciousness. It is doubtless true that the later social theory of rhetoric would not venture to define the end of discourse as that of declaring to another the absolute and universal truth. There may be two reasons for this. In the first place we are not now-a-days on such joyfully intimate terms with the absolute truth as was Plato. And, again, the practical value of even a little relative and perhaps temporary truth has become clearer to us—such truth as touches us through our personal experiences and observations. Yet it must be remembered that

Plato himself allowed the subject-matter of discourse to be the speaker's own vision of the absolute truth, thus individualizing the abstraction until we cannot regard it as fundamentally alien from our modern conception of experience, in the largest sense of the word.

Granting this substantial identity, then, we have only to prove that Plato's idea of personal experience as the subject-matter of discourse is a real factor in modern rhetorical theory. For this no long argument is required. We find this idea theoretically expressed in rhetorical treatises even as far back as Quintilian, in the implied definition of discourse as self-expression, a conception recently popularized by such writers as Arnold and Pater. This notion of discourse, neglecting that part of the process of communication by which an experience is set up in the mind of the writer, emphasized exclusively that segment which develops the experience of the writer into articulate form. Being thus incomplete as was the sophistic theory of discourse, it served only to supplement that by bringing out into clear consciousness the Platonic truth that the subject-matter of discourse has a direct relation to the mental processes of the writer.

On the practical side this truth has appeared in the comparatively recent decay of formal instruction in rhetoric, and the correlative growth of composition work in our schools. This practical study of composition, in so far as it deserved its name, displaced the writing of biographical essays, largely drawn from encyclopediac sources, and of treatises on abstract subjects far removed from any natural interests of the student who wrote. Both these lines of effort proving relatively profitless, the experiment was tried of drawing the material for writing directly from the every-day experience, observation and thinking of the student,—an experiment whose results proved so successful that the practice has long been established in most of our schools. This is a piece of history so recent and so well-known that it need not be dwelt upon. Its import, however, is worth noting. It means the practical, though perhaps unconscious, acceptance of Plato's principle that the subject-matter of discourse bears a vital relation to the mind of the speaker. And by virtue of this, it means the

complete closing of the circuit of communication between speaker and hearer.

So far, then, the rising modern rhetorical theory agrees with the doctrine of Plato. It may, perhaps, differ from him in making discourse a process somewhat less self-conscious than he seems to have conceived it, arising from the speaker's primitive social instinct for sympathy, or (to put it more technically) for closer relations with his environment, rather than from any explicit desire to communicate his own vision of the truth to another. But this modification affects neither the nature of the process itself nor its ultimate outcome. Both the Platonic and the modern theory of discourse make it not an individualistic and isolated process for the advantage of the speaker alone, but a real communication between speaker and hearer, to the equal advantage of both, and thus a real function of the social organism.

This conception of discourse is rich in implications which Plato never saw, and which no modern has yet formulated. To this formulation, however, our practical teaching of English with all its psychologic and sociological import, is daily bringing us nearer. It cannot be long before we shall recognize a modern theory of discourse as large in its outlines as Plato's and far better defined in its details; a theory which shall complete the social justification which rhetoric has so long been silently working out for itself.

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GERMAN LANGUAGE.

Materials for German Prose Composition.

With notes and vocabulary. Vol. ii, Narrative and Descriptive. By MAX POLL, Ph.D. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1899. 12mo, pp. 133+168 (Vocab.).

German Composition, based on humorous stories. By CARLA WENCKEBACH. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1899. 12mo, 282 pp.

THE mastery of any language naturally involves the power to express one's thoughts in

it both in speech and in writing. These two are intimately associated, and it is a question in my mind whether a student can write a foreign language easily and accurately, save as he possesses a corresponding power to speak it. For both there are alike necessary a command of the proper words and idioms, which are the symbols of thought, and an instinctive feeling for the correct order. It is true that one can speak with reasonable accuracy who cannot write, but it does not seem to me that one can write who does not possess a ready command of spoken forms. If this be true, it has an important bearing upon what should constitute the contents of a volume for teaching composition in a foreign language. The language should be simple and natural, and the subjects should be such as lend themselves readily to practical use. Conversations, descriptions, and attractive stories are demanded, but the language and the constructions should be those of familiar intercourse, of every-day life. No one speaks like a book; if he does so, he becomes intolerable. If it were possible to teach a lofty literary form of expression, colored with the individuality of some particular author, the acquisition would be in the main useless. The student would be powerless to discuss subjects with which he is daily associated, and upon his arrival in Germany his material for conversation or communication would utterly fail.

What is to be attained by German Composition does not always seem to have been clearly before the makers of such books. There are natural and inevitable limitations to what may be demanded in this direction. One limitation is based upon the time available for the study of a modern language, which is in itself restricted; another is to be found in the acquisition possible in the case of the average student in writing German.

It is evident that in the study of any language this feature must be subordinate to the general end. It must be proportional, and in harmony with other essential aims in linguistic study. A knowledge of the literature is the one universal requirement. Grammar and so-called philological study as an aid to this have their place, and conversation presents certain valid but not general claims.

Unless a vocabulary and a facility in the use

of foreign idioms dwell already in the mind, the first steps in writing are a mechanical process. The pupil has no feeling for the language which can guarantee the accuracy of any rendering. He is dependent at first upon the arbitrary statement of the teacher. If he has to choose laboriously the proper words from a vocabulary, and arrange them in a formal order, he has but a vague conception of the admissibility of any translation. Repeated instruction may fix the order and the use of the proper words in his mind. As a result, he acquires a knowledge of construction, which, in itself, is a valuable acquisition, and possibly one not to be obtained save through writing.

After an exercise has been written and revised by the teacher, few pupils remember it so that they can reproduce it if called upon to do so. Students seldom possess a verbal memory which enables them to retain a thought in a foreign language save as it is impressed upon the memory by repetition and familiar use. It is rare even in one's native language for a writer to retain accurately, after writing, the exact form in which his statement has been made. If this is so in one's own speech, it is true in a more emphatic sense in translations into a foreign language. There is, therefore, a certain limitation in what we may expect to achieve in teaching composition to the general student.

A recognition of such facts as these would aid in determining the place of composition in any course of study, and guide our estimate of the value of the results attained. It would also suggest the character and fix the value of any manual of instruction.

The first aim in such a volume would be to impress upon the pupil the use of familiar words and forms and principles of construction. Later, when he has read much easy prose, and attained a certain feeling for the language, he should re-write exercises from connected narrative, the text of which supplies the words and suggests the form of arrangement. His knowledge of what constitutes accuracy does not then rest merely upon the authority of the teacher, but he learns to write from the language itself.

Such a volume would naturally contain only

language in its familiar use. Thought is expressed in certain stereotyped forms. It is this which makes the interchange of ideas possible. If the pupil can master these, he has made a positive and useful acquisition which is of accepted value everywhere. The vocabulary should be specially chosen and restricted. The variety of expression possible by a mastery of from four to six hundred words is practically unlimited. The selections should be graded so that there is an orderly development of the principles of the language.

The question arises whether such a volume cannot be made which, while unfolding the principles of the language, shall, at the same time, contain a practical speech which the student can use in travel, in visiting a city, and in familiar descriptions. Such a volume of selections would, in its contents, border closely on the material used in conversational classes. Letters embracing lively narrative should also be included. The choice of selections from the German, skilfully translated and re-adapted, has ordinarily the advantage that they are free from embarrassing English idioms. The language, as has already been said, should not be stilted or even classical. When thought receives a certain stamp or color from the individuality of the author, features are introduced which transcend the forms of ordinary speech, and which it is not desirable to imitate. The writings of Mark Twain, Raumer, Macaulay, do not afford the requisite material for such a book. Even the Vicar of Wakefield, which was once the favorite vehicle for such instruction, is too full of quaint and antiquated expressions to afford the best results. Latin essays in the English universities were formerly written in the style of Tacitus or of Cicero. Such imitations of characteristic features of an author are to be avoided. If the pupil acquires the accepted currency of familiar expression, it is all that we can ask. A dominance of fairy tales is likewise injudicious. Mere infantile speech cannot interest an advanced student, and, though usually simple, presents no adequate substitute for the direct and serviceable speech of travel and familiar intercourse.

The first of the two new composition books whose titles are given above is intended to be

"an alternative collection" to that made by Prof. von Jagemann, and follows, according to the editor, the same general lines. It is also accompanied by the same vocabulary. It contains foot-notes guiding to the proper rendering, and refers constantly to von Jagemann's very useful "Elements of German Syntax."

Between the two volumes of this series there is little difference in the relative difficulty of the selections. The later has greater variety, and a more graphic quality. It is not quite clear why two volumes on the same general plan are desirable. The original vocabulary was excellent, and the use of one vocabulary for both volumes has less objection than one might anticipate. Words in the text which do not occur in the vocabulary have been inserted in foot-notes. The editor has not in all cases been successful in supplying the words which are missing in the vocabulary. The omissions are, however, probably few. Occasionally we miss notes which would have aided certain renderings for which the vocabulary is inadequate. There is no note on "to look out of the window at" etc., p. 23, l. 12, and the definitions in the vocabulary would not suggest the correct words. We miss in the vocabulary such words as "merchant ships" p. 79, l. 7; "un-eventful" p. 78, l. 4, etc., etc. Few students could render "Cheap Furniture Exhibition" from the meagre note "Compound." In the note to "all of the first six pages" p. 33, l. 1, "all" is translated by *alle*, as if modifying "pages." It may be doubted whether the choice of selections from modern English reading books affords the best models for reproduction. Similarly, the geographical and historical selections, including one from Walter Scott, as well as that from *Die Familie Buchholz*, are not the best adapted to the purpose sought. The book, however, has substantial merit.

The volume by Prof. Wenckebach contains in the beginning German stories, with a paraphrase on the opposite page for re-writing, and, at the foot of the page, conversations based upon the text, together with notes. The method is excellent and rests upon sound pedagogical principles. The selections are, in general, good, and include letters. There are useful supplementary chapters, one containing drill-exercises, and a very serviceable one

upon word-order. The vocabulary contains an English-German as well as a German-English part. The principle of humor adopted in making the selections is perhaps calculated to awaken interest, though not necessarily educative. It is not clear what is gained by reproducing Eckstein's "Visit to the Carcer" in lisping English.

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ITALIAN LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE.

1. *First Italian Book: Grammar, Exercises, and Examination Papers, with Vocabularies.* By Rev. A. C. CLAPIN, M. A., St. John's College, Cambridge, and Bachelier ès Lettres of the University of France. London and Paris: Hachette and Company, 1897. 18mo, pp. viii, 70.

2. *Un Curioso Accidente.* Commedia in tre atti di CARLO GOLDONI. Edited with Introduction and Notes by J. D. M. FORD, Ph. D., Instructor in Harvard University. Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1899. 12mo, pp. ix, 78.

1. MR. CLAPIN states in his preface that the purpose of his little grammar is to meet the requirements of those who have only a limited time to devote to the study of the grammar and idioms of the Italian Language. Certainly it is not a suitable work for the serious student of Italian, not only because of its extreme brevity, but also because of the incorrectness of some of its statements.

The synoptical arrangement restricts each subject to its own page. The grammar portion of the book is followed by exercises, a page of exercises being provided for every corresponding page of grammar.

The great danger in a short, grammatical treatise like the one before us, is the temptation to sacrifice clearness and accuracy to brevity. That Mr. Clapin has yielded to this temptation in many instances will be seen from the corrections which follow. P. 1: The statement that "the vowels *a, e, i, o* are sounded as in French" is misleading. The usual sound of French *a*

is that found in words like *page, par, a*, but this sound is much closer than the Italian *a*. The open *a* sound in the French *bas, âge, flamme* is pronounced like the Italian *a*, but the open *a* in *bas*, etc., is less frequent than the close *a* in *page*, etc.; hence, one could not say that *a* is pronounced in Italian as it is in French. In like manner the varieties of *e* and *o* sounds in French would hardly permit one to compare the pronunciation of these vowels in French with the sounds usually given to them in Italian. The cases where they differ in pronunciation should at least be stated.

In the second place, the statement that *a, e, i, o* are pronounced in Italian as in French will be of little or no value to those for whom this grammar was intended. It presupposes a knowledge of French, and, as this grammar was written primarily for English students, the phonetic equivalents of the Italian vowels should have been given in English rather than in French. P. 2: The author states that

"when the plural noun ends in *gli*, the *g* of the article *gli* is dropped (that is, *li* is used) to prevent the repetition of the same sound; for example, *li scogli*."

Fornaciari² gives *gli scogli* without mentioning *li* in this connection. P. 17: While discussing verbs in *ire* the author says:

"twelve only are conjugated throughout like *sentire*, namely: *bollire, cucire, dormire, fuggire, partire, pentirsi, sdruccire, seguire, sentire, servire, sortire, vestire*."

This statement is misleading. Although all the verbs given above may be conjugated like *sentire*, only *dormire, fuggire, pentire, servire, vestire* are always conjugated thus. *Aborrire, bollire*, and verbs in *-vertire* are generally, and *assorbire, inghiottire, mentire, nutrire, tossire*, are often conjugated like *sentire*. *Partire* and *sortire* are, when transitive, inflected like *finire*; when intransitive, like *sentire*. P. 18: the statement that "the conj. pronouns follow the verb (and are joined to it) in the Inf., Gerund, Past Part. and Imperative" should be modified. These pronouns are joined to the past participle only when it is used without an

¹ Cf. John E. Matzke, *A Primer of French Pronunciation*. New York, 1897, § 15.

² Fornaciari, *Grammatica Italiana dell' Uso Moderno*. Firenze, 1879, p. 78: "Si usa la seconda forma (sing. *lo*, plur. *gli*) davanti a nome maschile che cominci per *s* impura o per *z* o per *j*. P. es. *lo stúdio, gli stúdi; lo sc:glío, gli sc:gli*."

auxiliary.³ P. 31: the following rule is incorrectly given:

"The past participle conjugated with *avere* (with *essere* in Reflexive verbs) *must* agree with the direct object of the verb when this direct object precedes it, and *may* when it follows it."

This rule should be stated as follows: The past participle may or may not agree with its direct object according to the choice of the writer. It nearly always agrees when the object is a personal pronoun standing before the verb; it generally does not agree when the object follows.

Omissions in the Italian-English Vocabulary: *allegd* (*allegare*) 'alleged' (p. 45, 21, 3); *lire*, 'francs' (p. 42, 15, 6); *perdita*, 'loss' (p. 44, 19, 7); *scuse*, 'excuses' (p. 45, 21, 2); *subita* (*subire*), 'sustained' (p. 44, 19, 7).

Omissions in the English-Italian Vocabulary: *conquered*, 'vinto' (p. 46, 23, 3); *mouth*, 'bocca,' (p. 46, 23, 6); *nature*, 'natura,' (p. 46, 23, 5); *owe*, 'dovere,' 'essere debitore di' (p. 45, 21, 2); *powerful*, 'poderoso' (p. 46, 23, 1); *Rome*, 'Roma' (p. 37, 6, 2); *talent*, 'talento' (p. 46, 23, 6); *timid*, 'timoroso,' 'pauroso' (p. 38, 7, 7); *together*, 'insieme' (p. 45, 21, 2); *vice*, 'vizio' (p. 46, 24, 1); *will*, 'volontà' (p. 46, 23, 7).

The only typographical error that I have noted is *egla* for *egli* on p. 12.

2. Dr. Ford has shown excellent judgment in selecting a play so bright and entertaining as the one before us. It is a pleasure to call attention to this praiseworthy and highly successful attempt to provide the English-Italian student with an annotated copy of one of the standard works of modern Italian literature. This pure and charming little production of the great Italian dramatist will, no doubt, be welcomed with great satisfaction by those for whose use it is intended. *Un Curioso Accidente* is one of those plays of which an edition for college students was an imperative need, and it is but just to the editor to say that he has fulfilled his task in a reasonably satisfactory manner.

There are five pages in the Introduction. The first two pages are devoted to a brief sketch of the author's life, dealing especially

³ Cf. Grandgent, *Italian Grammar*. Boston, 1891, § 48.

with the literary history. The three remaining pages consist of a few general comments on Goldoni's literary style and writings, with special reference to his work in ridding the Italian stage of the *Commedia dell' arte*.

The Notes are free from that over-annotation which has become such a hindrance in many of our modern text-books. In some cases the editor has even failed to give a note where an explanation might have been useful to the student. P. 10, l. 25: since *vo'* (=voglio)⁴ was explained in the Notes, it would have been well to give a note on *rimanghiate*. This is an old subjunctive form. The modern form is *rimaniate*. P. 18, l. 2: *anderò* is also antiquated; the ordinary form is *andrò*. P. 53, l. 31: *tai* is the poetic form of *tale*. P. 55, l. 19: the use of *fa* should be explained.

Two of the notes are wrongly placed. If the notes are to be helpful to the student they should be given where the difficulty first occurs. P. 11, l. 11: note 5 to page 39, should come here. P. 11, l. 28: put note 3 to page 66 here.

The following typographical errors have been noted: P. vii, l. 18, read *become* for *became*; p. 9, l. 15, for *piu* read *più*; p. 69, note 1 to page 1, read *pud*.

Dr. Ford's edition of *Un Curioso Accidente* shows careful and scholarly preparation, and will certainly be of great service to the student of Italian literature.

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GERMAN LITERATURE.

Schiller's *Maria Stuart*. Ein Trauerspiel. With Introduction and Notes by HERMANN SCHOENFELD, Ph. D. New York: Macmillan Co., 1899. 8vo, lvii, 322 pp.

THIS newest edition of *Maria Stuart* appears just a hundred years after the play was written and is the most elaborate one offered to English students. The editor has

"sought to add . . . the best results of recent historical investigation and literary criticism, and to contribute such independent research

⁴ Cf. p. 39, note 5.

as might aid, by fuller elucidation, to bring (?) the classic nearer the hearts of the many students of Schiller."

The book is an honest effort to carry out this purpose, and shows broad scholarship, sensible criticism, and very great care in the preparation of the elaborate commentary.

The Introduction devotes fifty-seven pages to a discussion of the position of *Maria Stuart* among Schiller's dramas, of the composition, the historical questions, and the metrical form of the play. In the comparison of this with Schiller's other plays, the editor almost forgets his real purpose, and does little more than give the theme of *Die Räuber*, *Fiesco*, *Kabale und Liebe*, and *Don Carlos*, and point out the "tragic element" in *Wallenstein*, *Maria Stuart*, *Die Jungfrau von Orleans*, *Die Braut von Messina*, and *Tell*. The treatment of the "dramatic guilt or *Schuld*" in *Tell* is a little confusing. Schoenfeld thinks "it is strange that this manifest tragedy has not been noticed." Surely he does not mean to say that others have failed to see "the guilt of the House of Habsburg." That would be "strange" indeed. It may be that others have seen the essential difference between the retribution that overtakes the 'villain' in this, and the "tragic guilt" of the hero in other plays. Schiller saw it, too, when he called this "a drama" and others "tragedies."

The account of the composition of the play is carefully written, but very long. Many extracts from Schiller's letters show the progress of the work from month to month, or from week to week. Such detail may be welcome to teachers, as convenient for reference, but students would find greater interest and profit in a shorter, general statement. In view of Boxberger's work on Brantôme as one of Schiller's sources, it is hardly enough to say that "the fifth act seems to indicate . . . that Schiller had read Brantôme."

The discussion of the historical questions involved shows the same careful, critical detail, but is too exhaustive and exhausting for students. The critical inquiry into the genuineness of the "casket letters" and of the Babington letters, does not belong in an edition of this kind. On the other hand, the sketch would

gain in clearness if Elizabeth's part were more fully presented.

In the section on Metrical Form, two or three pages which the student would read would have been more useful than the eight pages of minute detail which he may not read. The foreign plurals "dactyli" and "trochaei" look strange by the side of the English form "anapests."

The text is based on Goedeke's *Historisch-kritische Ausgabe*; the "orthography and punctuation have been modernized but sparingly according to present requirements."

The Notes are very elaborate and scholarly, and are carefully written. Opinion may differ as to their pedagogical value. They fill one hundred and seven pages, Act I, forty-seven pages of text, receiving forty-eight pages of notes, while the first one hundred lines get over eleven pages! The reviewer was reminded of the opinion of Goethe's *Theater-Direktor* :—

Die Masse Könnst ihr nur durch Masse zwingen,
Ein jeder sucht sich endlich selbst was aus,
Wer vieles bringt, wird manchem etwas bringen;
Und jeder geht zufrieden aus dem Haus.

In spite of the wealth of information in these notes, I fear the American student, for whom they were written, may often turn from them very *unzufrieden*, when he finds so much explanation he does not need, and so much learned, philological matter he does not want. Several characteristics of these notes seem likely to lessen, very materially, their real usefulness.

First, there are many apparently unnecessary notes. Students of *Maria Stuart* are not beginners, and rarely need such notes as those on lines 1, 2, 5, 18, 32, 54, 63, 73, 96, 114, 130, 133-4, 141, which fall within the first scene only; further on are many others of the same kind.

Again, the editor has put in a great deal of etymology—sometimes incidentally, but often for the sake of the etymology alone. Sometimes the proportion is excessive; of eleven notes on ll. 1077-1091, for instance, eight are etymological. These etymologies include Latin, Greek, Anglo-Saxon, Gothic, Norse, Old and Middle High German, Alemannic, Low German, Old and Modern French, Italian, Spanish, and even Hungarian and Arabic. However interesting and important etymology

may be, in its proper place, and however helpful an occasional use of it may be in explaining some old or unusual meaning, surely so many etymological notes to a play like this are out of place, for students either do not read them, or if they do, are only led away from more important things. This is not the way "to bring this classic nearer to the hearts of students of Schiller."

In explaining grammatical points, the editor often heaps up examples of the same or similar points, occurring elsewhere in Schiller or in other authors. Thus in the note to l. 39 Schoenfeld explains that *des Spiegels kleine Notdurft* means *der notdürftige kleine Spiegel*, and prints in full twenty-two other examples of the use of such abstracts from *Der Graf von Habsburg*, *Maria Stuart*, and *Tell*; in the note to l. 59: *wenn ihre zarte Jugend sich verging*, instead of *wenn sie in ihrer zarten Jugend* etc., thirteen other examples of the same (every day) use of the abstract for the concrete are cited in full, and all the poetry is taken out of the passage; in the note to l. 210 it takes eleven lines of print and twelve examples to explain the omission of the neuter adjective ending *-es* in *geängstigt fürchtend Herz*, which every student of the play recognizes at once. Compare also the notes to ll. 33, 49, 85, 226, all within the first scene, and many others further on. These examples are also often used to remind us of some similar sentiment in some other author. Some of these references will not be clear to the student; cf. notes to ll. 62, 750, 1172, 1648, 3200. In ll. 3835-36, the "curious reminiscence of Horace" is unintelligible, unless we assume a misprint for 3855-56, and even then the comparison is very far-fetched.

Idioms are not only explained, but explained away. Thus:—l. 142, "*den Christus in der Hand*, absolute accusative with *haltend* understood" (absolute acc. and direct object at the same time!); l. 590, "*wo man hinaus will*, idiom. use, with the omission of a verb *kommen* with the auxiliary *will*;" l. 905, "*warum mir verweigern*, supply *wollt ihr*;" l. 1886 "*Bube genug*, here treated like an adjective, *büßisch genug*." Apart from the contradictions involved in such statements, as a matter of fact these words are not *understood* or to be *sup-*

plied, not even in English. These expressions are idioms, and idiom is the very soul of language, and should be emphasized, not destroyed, especially when the student uses the same idiom in his own speech.

In some cases the very technical terms employed will make the note useless to the student. To say that phrases are "asyndetically joined" (86 ff, 104), or to refer to a construction as an example of "Chiasmus, *χιασμός*" (794-6), or "anakolouthon" (86-97), or "anadiplosis" (923, 924, 2201), or "hendiadys" (949), or "oxymoron" (197-8), or "cacophony" (1772), or "prolepsis (*προλήψις*), i. e. anticipation (*Vorwegnahme*)" (271-72), will not materially help, but will materially aggravate the young reader.

Misprints are few:— arrivedat (49), spie (212), Rhoades (786), Lal. (289), morning (1149), Ettersbury, Introd. note to iii, 1. In note to l. 806 read *Vor grauen Jahren lebt* (not *wohnt*) *ein Mann im Osten*.

Two appendices give variant readings and a very useful bibliography. The mechanical execution of the book is excellent, and there are half a dozen good pictures.

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FRENCH TEXT-BOOKS.

Le Gendre de M. Poirier, par EMILE AUGIER et JULES SANDEAU. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by W. STUART SYMINGTON, Ph. D. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1899.

Le Crime de Sylvestre Bonnard, par ANATOLE FRANCE. With Introduction and Notes, by C. H. C. WRIGHT. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1899.

WHY are there so few French text-books that introduce us into an academic atmosphere? This is a question that presents itself to almost every teacher of advanced courses; and yet there is certainly no lack of publications of French texts. The present writer must confess that among the dozens of new editions that are run through an indulgent press, he is able to find few that are worthy of full commendation.

The introductions are either taken for the most part from some encyclopedia, or else contain a treatise on the subject in hand, writ-

ten in such an "æsthetic" style, that we look in vain for facts and for a clear presentation of the material. The notes are often mere translations, or simply copies of those found in other editions, under a disguised form; and the text is miserable, at least in many cases. The average edition would seem to have been prepared, as it were, over-night. And yet, we notice favorable reviews of these same editions, with elaborate lists of their inaccuracies and misprints.

In all this indifferent editing we are gratified to find a few texts that show a thorough familiarity with the subject, broad reading, and scholarly work. Among these we have selected the two texts mentioned above.

In his Introduction Dr. Symington has presented the student with a clear, concise idea 1. of Augier's dramatic work; 2. of his standing among French dramatists; 3. of the variance of opinion of French critics concerning the merit of his work in general and of the production in question; 4. of his style and his *don du théâtre*. More than this, the student receives in this Introduction a clear notion of the nature of the modern French drama. In reading it one feels that the editor has a firm footing, and has read enough in French literature to warrant an opinion of his own; and we are ready to accept it; as, for example, on page eighteen.

Every phase of French literature has been treated so thoroughly and by so many different critics, that it becomes necessary to consult a large body of critical literature. In the opinion of the present reviewer the scarcity of genuine scholarly work in modern French literature is due to the fact that there is so much ground to cover that few have found the time necessary for this original work. It is certainly a pleasure to read introductions that show this broad reading, and yet retain enough independence and thoroughness to be called an addition to what we already have. The two books indicated above possess this rare quality.

In the notes the student has enough to guide him and help him over those points which he cannot be expected to know. They are not elaborate, but they are amply sufficient.

The Introduction of Mr. Wright is quite different in character, composition and form, from

that of the work just noted. While the former shows soberness, care, conservatism in statements, accuracy and precision, we notice in the latter a spirit of the valedictorian, of indefiniteness, of too much generalization. In fact, these two works are contrasts, and show the atmosphere of the products of two entirely different systems: the first, solid, plain-fact, analytical, rigid specialism; the second, broad, general, cosmopolitan, æsthetic culture. Yet both, in this case, reach the same goal—the academic spirit.

The Introduction to M. Anatole France leaves a clear, definite idea 1. of certain tendencies in modern French literature and those which M. France has followed; 2. of his character and work; 3. of the position he holds in modern French literature.

The notes are adequate; at times we meet explanations that seem unnecessary; for example, p. 244, *parle pour ne rien dire, paléographe*; p. 264, Rousseau; it is probable a second year student will know these. In general, this part of the book is excellent and shows careful, scholarly work.

Mention might here be made of an edition of part of *Sylvestre Bonnard* by Prof. Magill, in his *Modern French Series*, Christopher Sower Company, Philadelphia. This edition contains a Biographical Notice and a series of elaborate notes, many of which we find in Mr. Wright's text.

It is the opinion of the present reviewer that if the editing of French texts were confined to teachers of French, and if these would limit themselves to editing in certain definite fields only and to fewer texts, the standard of our text-books would be immediately raised.

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ENGLISH LITERATURE.

The Seege of Troye. Edited from MS. Harl. 525. With Introduction, Notes, and Glossaries by C. H. A. WAGER, Ph. D. (Yale.) McIlvaine Professor of the English Language and Literature, Kenyon College. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1899. 12mo, pp. cxv, 126.

As we already have a diplomatic reproduction of the Middle English version of the *Seege of*

Troie—a very indifferent résumé, in less than two thousand lines, of the narrative of some twenty thousand lines, in the *Roman de Troie* of Benoît de Sainte-More—the only justification for its re-impression would be in an edition which contributes some new and definite information upon its language, date, and sources.

The present editor announces (p. lxxxvi) that in his linguistic treatment he only wishes to "throw light upon the dialect in which the version is written," and adds nothing to strengthen its generally accepted attribution to an author of Southern origin. Certain statements in the section, treating of the metrical structure, would have been qualified, if attention had been called to conclusions brought out in the more recent contributions on Middle English prosody; and the date assigned, 1390-1420 (pp. xxv, xlii), although it has the merit of affording a wide margin for possible error, is too indefinite to be discussed.

Dr. Wager's final conclusion that the immediate source of the work was an expanded recension of the *Roman de Troie*, because certain episodes are not found in "the poem of Benoît with which we are familiar" (p. lxxviii, cf. pp. lxv, xix), falls to the ground in view of what Constans has stated as to the inferiority and incompleteness of the manuscripts, upon which Joly based his edition. To be sure, the fact that the treatment in the English poem, of the strife of the three goddesses for the golden apple, and the judgment of Paris, has a close analogue in the story as found in the *Énéas*,¹ which is different from that given in the *Roman de Troie*,² seems to support a thesis which cannot be definitely determined until the publication of the complete poem.

The statement (p. lx) "Archeley, Harl. 729; is more easily derived from the Archelaus of Dares G. (Chap. xiv) than from Benoît's Archelax" is not very convincing when one considers that -ax is the most common *graphie* for -aus. The suggestion (p. xxii) that Boccaccio, humanist, and translator of French fab-

¹ V. 99-182, edition of Salverda de Grave. Cf. Introd., pp. viii, xxix, lxiv.

² V. 3855 ff. Cf. Constans. *Revue des Universités du Midi*, vol. iv, p. 69. One version of story in the *Chide Moralise*. Cf. G. Paris, *Hist. Litt.*, vol. xxix, p. 518. A. Thomas, *Romania*, vol. xxii, p. 271.

leaux, needed to have resort to the Italian versions of Guido and Benoît in writing his *Filostrato*, is hardly a happy one.

As to the ultimate sources of the poem the existence of the Greek original of Dictys was put beyond a doubt by the quite independent investigations of Patzig and Noack, some years ago, and yet there is no indication of an acquaintance with these most important contributions. And there is absolutely no evidence upon which to base the statement that Dares—that impudent forgery, of a date not earlier than the fifth century, of which the only purpose seems to be, to out-Dictys—is an abridgement of a translation from the Greek made in the first century (p. xvii).

Warton's *History of English Poetry* is cited, and Mongitore's *Bibliotheca Sicula* is listed in the bibliography, but there is no mention of Monaci's or Cesareo's notes upon Guido delle Colonne, and Koeppl's and Schick's papers on Lydgate are considered of too little importance to be referred to. The works of Bugge and Krause might have been mentioned when speaking of the Troy legend in Scandanavian mythology; information a little more definite about "Nennius of whom nothing is certainly known" (p. xii), might have been gained from the contributions of Zimmer—the title of whose book is given in the bibliography—Thurneysen and Mommsen; recent publications on the Irish versions of the Troy matter might have been noted,—and why does one think of dusty folios when he meets such names as "Fredegarius Scholasticus" (p. xi) and Ptolemæus Ægyptus" (p. xx)?

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FRENCH LITERATURE.

Scènes de voyage de Victor Hugo. Edited with introduction and notes by THOMAS BERTRAND BRONSON, A. M. Vol. 1. *De Paris à Aix-la-Chapelle*. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1899. Narrow 16mo, buckram, pp. xvi+277.

UNDER the above title the editor has grouped a series of sketches or letters taken from *le Rhin*, a work which Hugo published in two volumes in January, 1842. At that date the

poet was courting political power. The desire to play a rôle in politics had manifested itself the year before, if not earlier. From the moment of his reception into the French Academy in June, 1841, Hugo had apparently been anxious to prove himself a statesman, and had begun at once to write upon France's foreign policy and the political conditions of Europe. Two powers were, according to him, threatening the independence of Europe; these were England and Russia. Against these two France was to form an alliance with Germany; England was to be pushed into the ocean, and Russia into Asia. France was to aid Prussia in extending and unifying her power, and in return the left bank of the Rhine was to be restored to France. Hugo's discussion of this scheme was incorporated in *le Rhin* under the caption: *Conclusion*. It constitutes the third and political part of the work. Evidently also it was for the author the significant part of the work. The earlier "lettres de voyage," from which the present selections are taken, were evidently only intended to introduce or lead up to the political discussion at the close.

A marked political bearing is also noticeable in the author's preface, which is included in the present edition. While Hugo touches upon his reasons for the publication of letters which had been written to a friend a few years before, the question of the Rhine, considered politically, is the most significant feature. This preface, though illustrating here and there the author's inveterate tendency to wordiness, and though containing some needlessly long sentences, offers the student interesting and not difficult reading. Hugo states two or three times that he is publishing his work in two volumes; attention might have been called to the fact that it now appears in three.

In the letters which the editor has given, Hugo reaches Aix-la-Chapelle and has time to discourse at some length, and in an interesting way, upon Charlemagne, relics and reliquaries. The cathedral itself he naturally does not neglect. Hugo has a passion for churches, and gives some detailed descriptions of them in these sketches. He takes pains to mention the names of all the churches in a given town. He not only visits faithfully the churches of the towns where he stops, but also stops to visit any along the road between towns, and men-

tions having spent two hours in one of these latter. At Liège he laments that, on account of the heavy rain, he was able to visit only four churches. The spire is always noted, even if only in the distance. These letters also contain some delightful descriptions of route, river and landscape. Details are at times given touching the inn at which he stops. And proper names, of course, could not be absent. In the use of these Hugo is, in this part of his work, somewhat moderate, at least as compared with letter xxv. later on, with its four hundred and sixty proper names. And yet some pages of the editor's volume are quite full of them, so that the text seems at times overburdened. The notes are occupied largely with the explanation of these proper names, and an alphabetical list, which is appended, shows some two hundred and fifty of them. Hugo had started out with his Vergil and his Tacitus, and he gives his letters a generous sprinkling of Latin quotations (not always from these authors). These also, I think, burden the text at times, and their number might possibly have been reduced somewhat in a classroom aid of this kind. From the standpoint of the class-room, too, it may be said that a couple of passages are retained in the text, which perhaps might better have been cut out or cut down.

The editor's introduction is, to my mind, inadequate. In his estimate of Hugo he appears to have followed the verdict of Barbou, certainly not that of Edmond Biré. Hugo's manly aggressiveness and devotion to principle are praised; his colossal vanity and posing for effect are left untouched. His erudition is emphasized, but the degree to which this erudition may be open to suspicion is not stated. The editor passes over 1830 with the statement that everyone is familiar with the history of Hugo's connection with the Romantic movement. This is perhaps assuming too much, if the introduction is addressed to the ordinary student. The sentence beginning: "He lost his only daughter soon after her marriage," needs correction.

A map accompanies the selections, which are attractively printed. A second volume, entitled *le Rhin et les Alpes*, is to follow.

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